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Abstract
The main concern of a program manager is to manage the cost, schedule, and
performance triad of a program. Historically, programs tend to meet the performance
aspect at the expense of cost or schedule, or both. This research gives the acquisition
community a set of tools that enables them to impartially analyze the cost and schedule of
their programs, helping to mitigate these issues. Five regression models encompass this
toolset; one to estimate the median program cost and four to identify the probability of
realizing a given overrun. The cost model explains 81% of the variation in program
acquisition using seven predictor variables available to the estimator at the time of MS B
start. Four logistic models estimate the probabilities that a program may identify as a
program that experiences cost and schedule overruns of specific magnitudes from their MS
B estimate. These models predict the group the program may reside in with an accuracy of
at least 0.79 probability and use multiple predictor variables available at MS B. With these
tools the program manager has the ability to preemptively identify potential problems in
their program based on the program’s characteristics, potentially saving millions in cost and
schedule overruns.
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Using Multiple and Logistic Regression to Estimate the Median Will-Cost and Probability
of Cost and Schedule Overrun for Program Managers

I. Introduction
General Issue

The intersection of schedule and cost is of paramount importance, as it makes up two of
the three parts of the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)—the third being performance.
Managing both cost and schedule to achieve the desired performance is what a program
manager does by definition. Establishing realistic baselines for schedule and cost are
exceedingly difficult due to the nature of the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition
environment, as well as the levels of risk and uncertainty due to the nature of the program itself.
To combat the risk and uncertainty in cost and schedule, a program may err on the side of
caution—lengthening schedules and increasing cost estimates to unreasonably high levels in
order to capture all variability. This strategy is dangerous to the program and the community as
a whole in that it not only delays the fielding of an identified need to the warfighting
community; it also needlessly ties up funding that could be used to fund other critical assets.
On the opposite end of the spectrum lie the programs that are overly optimistic in terms
of cost and schedule. This strategy is equally dangerous in terms of potential negative
outcomes to both schedule and cost. A schedule that is overly optimistic runs the risk of
experiencing unscheduled delays due to potential re-work, if a problem is discovered that could
have been prevented, and the schedule allowed for the proper oversight. The expenses of
conducting this re-work can increase at an exponential rate as the program moves through the
acquisition process as demonstrated by Figure 1. Being overly optimistic in terms of program
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cost can lead decision makers to take critical funding from other programs or force a program
manager to delay the program until additional funding can be secured.

Figure 1: Cumulative LCC over Program Life

Specific Issue
There is a great deal of research that has been conducted concerning quantitatively
optimizing and predicting cost in a DoD program environment. Research conducted by Brown,
White, Ritschel, and Siebel (2015) identified cost expenditure trends and growth patterns.
Birchler, Christle, and Groo (2011) researched concurrency’s effect on cost growth using
multiple regression. There are many more examples of cost research and they are explored in
detail in Chapter II of this thesis.
One research project conducted at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
developed a quantitative method to predict a program schedule based on specific program
attributes. Prior to this method, and up to this point, the Air Force standard for estimating a
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program schedule has been to rely on the opinion of a subject matter expert (SME), or to rely
on the actual observed schedule of a similar completed program and adjust for differences
(Jimenezet al., 2016).
There has been no past research at AFIT that combines both cost and schedule into
quantitative models within a set of programs to provide benchmarks for program evaluation.
The goal of this research is to provide the Air Force acquisition community with a set of tools
to analyze where they may realize cost or schedule savings. At the very least, we strive toward
an unbiased method of generating a Will Cost estimate to serve as a benchmark to compare to
the actual program estimate and to identify what program characteristics may lead to significant
or critical overruns to the current program baseline. These, in turn, give program management
a starting point to look at reducing cost and schedule further as per the Should Cost and Should
Schedule directives.
Scope and Limitations of Research
The scope of this research is constrained to predicting a benchmark for program cost
starting at program initiation, Milestone-B (MS-B), through to Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) and for estimating the likelihood a program may stay within certain cost and schedule
bounds. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU), a government organization created to
provide the DoD acquisition personnel with a professional career path and training, defines IOC
thusly: “In general, attained when selected units and/or organizations in the force structure
scheduled to receive a new system have received it and have the ability to employ and maintain
it” (Defense Acquisition University, 2016). The official definition for IOC continues by stating
that each particular program defines its own IOC. With each program studied having its own
individual definition for IOC, there is a great deal of known variability in any model that
3

utilizes IOC as an evaluation point. Removing this variability by researching and determining a
universal definition for what IOC could be yields a more reliable model for predicting program
schedule. This research is limited further by only including programs that have cost data from
the Technology Development phase (pre-MS-B), since this data is used as a predictor variable
in the schedule model (Jimenez, 2016).
The definition we use as IOC is a limitation within the research due to the unavailability
of several data points concerning IOC within the dataset, as well as the highly subjective nature
of the definition of when IOC occurs in a program. Due to these limitations, research
alternatives to IOC as a termination point for our research. Access to the information that
makes it possible to create this new definition is also a limitation, as it is not readily available.
We utilize Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) to populate the data within the dataset
being analyzed. The SAR database contains the reported financial and schedule information for
select programs (Brown, White, Ritschel, & Seibel, 2015). The initial database from the SAR
data is compiled and available for us to utilize, and additional data points have been found
using SARs as well as other historical program documents. Another limitation we note is that
only programs that can be included in the regression model we use to predict schedule are
available for inclusion in the analysis for the cost model. We acknowledge that this approach
may not be the optimal method; however, due to the constraints on the data and the prior
research, we are confident moving forward by limiting the amount of programs to only those
that fit within the schedule model parameters.
Research Objectives
There are two main objectives of this research: to develop a statistical model to output the
median estimate for program Will-Cost, and to develop logistic regression models to estimate
4

the probability a program will overrun certain threshold values pertaining to both cost and
schedule. The Will-Cost multiple-regression model is intended to give the acquisition
community an unbiased median cost estimate for a program, which can, in turn, be used to
develop the Should-Cost estimate, in millions of dollars for BY17, for said program. The
logistic regression models for the overrun analysis give the decision makers in the Air Force
community a meaningful analysis for what program characteristics are more likely to
experience cost and schedule overruns of the magnitudes identified in this study.
Research Questions
Our research is focused on addressing two questions. Initially we address the question,
“How can we use and build upon a previously created database to develop a mathematical
model to predict the median cost of a program?” The second question we address is: “How can
we identify program characteristics for significantly and critically overrunning either cost,
schedule, or both given the current APB, at MS B through IOC, and predict the probability that
a program will experience such overruns?”

Summary
Creating an objective and statistically-sound method to predict the median program cost
provides the acquisition community with a tool to impartially estimate their Will-Cost, which
allows them to take a unique perspective on potential program efficiencies to affect their
Should-Cost goals. By analyzing the program cost and schedule estimates from MS B and
comparing them to the actuals based on the thresholds for significant and critical program
overruns we are able to give the program management community tools to identify potential
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problem programs and allocate resources accordingly.
A review of literature is conducted in Chapter II to identify potential program
stabilization points as a substitute for IOC, as well as reasons for cost and schedule variance
and their associated predictors. In Chapter III, the literature review is used to lay the foundation
for our database and data utilization methods. In Chapter IV, we build, test, and validate a
multiple-regression model for estimating the program median Will-Cost. In Chapter V we
analyze the program indicators for not meeting their cost or schedule estimates and calculate the
probabilities for programs, given certain characteristics, to fall into one of three groups. In
Chapter VI, we close with the conclusions of our research and any potential follow-on research.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
In this chapter, we conduct a review of the literature pertaining to relevant research into
DoD cost and schedule analysis in order to build a foundation and gain the insight required to
justify and conduct our research. In order to gain this insight, we provide an overview of the
research conducted in the past and highlight how we utilize what they found to move forward
with our research. In addition to identifying relevant research, we identify where we add
additional insights by conducting our research; specifically, we identify where we may alleviate
some of the research deficiencies.
The ensuing sections provide the background for building our database, validating the
previously built schedule benchmark model, building a cost benchmark model within the scope
of our schedule model, and combining the results from each model to gain insight into how
schedule and cost interact. Before cost and schedule are addressed, we take time to explore the
issue of using IOC as the conclusion point of our models.
Defining IOC
The focus of this thesis is to develop a model to estimate the median cost of a DoD
acquisition program and to identify the factors that may lead to a program overrunning certain
cost and schedule thresholds. However, IOC is an integral piece in achieving both of these
goals. Therefore, the literature review begins by researching what IOC is, the issues that we
have with using it in this form, and how it may affect the research. It is important to note that we
have not found any peer-reviewed research defining IOC into a more rigid concept.
IOC is a program milestone that is set by the program’s user community and program
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manager (PM) following the guidelines set by the acquisition community. DAU defines IOC as
being “attained when selected units and/or organizations in the force structure scheduled to
receive a new system have received it and have the ability to employ and maintain it.” (“Defense
Acquisition University (DAU) ‘IOC Definition,’” ) . The definition purposefully leaves out any
stringent empirical requirements for meeting IOC and standardized the programs only by
requiring all IOC dates to meet the minimum operational capabilities of the user community; this
simply means that whatever they are acquiring, it has to work. This subjective treatment of IOC
creates difficulty when objectively analyzing the data using a multiple-regression approach.
By having an end date to our research that varies from program to program in a nonuniform manner, we have introduced a great deal of known variability. When developing a
multiple regression model, one main objective is to explain as much of the variability as
possible—this makes the prediction more valid and accurate since the model can account for
more of the variability that is present within the population being studied. By accounting for this
source of known variability within our models, we are much more precise in predicting where a
program should be benchmarked for cost and schedule.
Past research has successfully used IOC as the end date, because it is generally outlined
in the SAR and readily available as a data point for each program. Research has even found that
approximately 91% of cost growth, experienced on certain aircraft and avionics programs, is
realized by the date each program defines as IOC (Kozlak, 2016). This fact allows us to
continue utilizing the given programmatic IOC dates in the model despite the risk to increased
variability. It is clear to us that a universal definition placing the finish line for each program in
the same place, whether that be a specific percent of total units fielded or the first unit equipped,
would be a better marker for reducing the variability when comparing multiple programs.
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Moving forward, we explore how cost and schedule have been analyzed in the past.
Schedule Research
A program’s schedule defines many aspects of the program: when the funding needs to
be spent, how much it costs, and when it delivers a critical requirement to the warfighter, to
name a few. Schedule overruns have been, and continue to be, a major issue in defense
acquisition programs. To combat this issue, the Secretary of the Air Force, Deborah James,
introduced a new initiative, called “Should Schedule”, in 2015. Should Schedule created a
benchmark for how long a program’s schedule should be, if identified process inefficiencies and
risks were driven out of the program (James, 2015). Essentially, should schedule develops a goal
for which a program should strive towards.
In the wake of this new Should Schedule requirement, which was levied on all
acquisition category I (ACAT I) programs, the largest and most highly visible programs in the
Air Force (AF), research conducted at AFIT developed a multiple regression model which could
be used to predict how long a program’s schedule should be, from MS-B to IOC, based on
historical figures. This model is successful at predicting a realistic program schedule—
explaining 42.9% of variability (Jimenez et al., 2016). The research was based on the inclusion
of 56 programs and relied upon three separate predictor variables that were deemed statistically
significant. The predictor variables were whether a program was a new start or a modification to
an existing platform, the year MS-B occurred as it related to a specific change in defense
acquisition policy, and the amount of funding prior to MS-B (Jimenez et al., 2016). This tool has
already been used, in an unofficial capacity, in the field by the KC-46 tanker program as a “cross
check” for the latest schedule estimate. The tool produced an estimate that was within four
months of the latest revised program schedule (E-mail in Appendix C).
9

In 2015, Brown, White, Ritschel, and Seibel conducted research to determine if there is a
better, more empirical method to estimate a programs expenditure curve over time. The widely
accepted method utilized in the acquisition community is the 60/40 “rule of thumb”, which states
that at a program’s halfway point, roughly 60% of the costs are accrued and 40% are remaining.
Specifically tying their research to aircraft development programs, they tested the 60/40 heuristic
and determined that it could not account for the differences between new start and modification
programs. Next, they researched program characteristics to construct an aircraft-centric
methodology. Lastly, they compared the accuracy of their models to the baseline 60/40 model—
finding that their Weibull model explained 74.6% of total variation, a 6.5% increase over the
60/40 heuristic (Brown et al., 2015).
The most important aspect of Brown’s research is utilized in our own research, which
was used in Jimenez’s research as well. There is a statistically significant shift in program
obligation expenditure rate between programs that began development prior to 1985 and those
that began post-1985 (Brown et al., 2015). This shift in expenditure rate is believed to be caused
by President Reagan’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (also referred to as
the Packard Commission), which was aimed at studying issues within the DoD acquisition
process (Packard, 1986). From this report came several recommendations, which are credited
with having led to many subsequent acquisition reform laws. These laws, in turn, affected the
nature of every acquisition program within the DoD since 1985. Given this knowledge, we
evaluate a binary variable which accounts for programs starting either before or after 1985,
which Jimenez et al. (2016) found highly predictive of schedule. Without this variable, we
would not be evaluating programs on an equal basis since they are subject to different rules.
Monaco and White (2005) attempted to predict schedule risk using a regression approach.
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They modified and used the database built by Sipple et al. (2004), and subsequently modified by
future research as mentioned in the “A Benchmark for Cost” section of this chapter, to include
67 programs in total. The goal of their research was to predict the probability, and associated
magnitude, of schedule growth within the programs studied (Monaco and White, 2005). Of
particular note within this research is the observation of data availability issues within the SAR
database.
Monaco expanded the research database to include programs from 1990 to 2003 that have
completed the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of acquisitions using
the final SAR report to populate their data. They built a logistic regression model to predict the
probability of schedule growth occurring and a multiple regression model to predict the
magnitude of schedule growth, given growth has occurred. When building their database to
perform these analyses they note that several potentially highly predictive variables cannot be
used due to their unavailability within the SARs. Most notably, the variable missing from the
majority of programs was the IOC date from either MS-B or EMD contract award (Monaco,
2005). Jimenez et al. (2016) note similar difficulties in obtaining an IOC date using the SAR
database. Despite the issues in obtaining data points for all of the identified potential predictors
of schedule, Monaco was able to build two highly predictive models.
Gailey III (2002) expanded upon the research conducted by Reig (1995) and increased
the database studied from 24 to 46 programs and re-evaluated the results. The study focused on
28 program characteristics that were analyzed to determine if any of them could be a predictor of
performance during the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase. In order to
do this, they split the programs into two groups using EMD duration overrun as the criterion and
defining the group with the larger overrun as “bad”, or unsuccessful (Gailey III, 2002).
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Cost Research
The cost of a program is of paramount importance and feeds into every aspect of the
program—from schedule to performance. Decision makers want to know where to allocate
precious resources and, to do this, they routinely rely on point estimates from the cost
community that may not be bound by historical facts or are overstated for budgetary concerns.
To combat this issue, the USD(AT&L) issued a memorandum in 2011, which mandated the use
of Will-Cost and Should-Cost management for all programs meeting the requirements. The
Will-Cost estimate is what the current program estimate is, which is to be compared to the
Should-Cost estimate. The Should-Cost estimate is meant to be what a program should cost if all
process inefficiencies are driven out; essentially, this becomes a benchmark for the program to
strive towards (MFR in Appendix A). There have been several empirical models aimed at
predicting program cost, none of which are widely used across the DoD. We use the completed
research to vector our own research in order to develop a complete and accurate model.
The most recent cost research conducted at AFIT, completed in 2016, focused on cost
growth amongst the programs studied. More specifically, the research is focused on identifying
factors that contribute to cost growth and what the historical cost growth is at the four major
program reviews. Most importantly to our research, they identified that bombers, prototyping,
and electronic aircraft systems upgrades were the most common predictors of cost growth at
these program reviews and that at IOC, the median percent of total cost growth experienced is
91% (Kozlak, 2016). We use this information to identify and evaluate these three predictor
variables for inclusion into our cost-estimating model. The findings that IOC was a point in the
program lifecycle, where the majority of cost growth was realized, means that our assumptions to
continue using IOC as a program termination date is valid. This is critical since our schedule
12

model does not include any programs for which we cannot ascertain the IOC date and cost
information.
The study conducted by Deitz, Eveleigh, Holzer, & Sarkani (2013) examined the
importance of developing a robust Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) prior to MS-B and the effects
that an analysis of this nature may have on program success. According to their research, the
DoD has a history of rushing programs into development that are simply not ready due to various
reasons. In the case of the Joint Strike Fighter, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
attributed a major factor for the cost overrun to the program prematurely entering into EMD.
The researchers stated that, while only 10% of a program’s life-cycle cost was invested prior to
MS-B, it may be the most important 10% because 70% of a program’s life-cycle costs are
committed and set at this phase (Deitz et al. 2013). These findings indicate that the most
important time for cost savings in a program is prior to MS-B and are important for our research
because they validate using pre-MS-B data in our estimating models.
Birchler, Christle, & Groo (2011) studied the idea of concurrency, or developing a
weapons system while in production, and cost growth. The researchers acknowledged that
concurrency could inherently increase program risk, which could foreseeably lead to cost
growth, as is the consensus in the acquisition community. They made the point that every
program had some level of concurrency, and concurrency is necessary in any environment other
than a zero-risk environment. Their research is focused on exploring the relationship between
concurrency and cost growth (Birchler et al., 2011).
In their study, they defined concurrency as “the proportion of research, development, test
and evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations that are authorized during the same years that
procurement appropriations are authorized” (Birchler et al., 2011:5). They further defined
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concurrency in their research as the point where less than 95% of the total amount of RDT&E
funding is still being spent, while procurement is taking place. This metric was used because
they reason that RDT&E funding is spent throughout most of a program’s life for various
reasons that do not necessarily deal with concurrency and, therefore, anything less than 5% of
the total amount of RDT&E funding being spent at this time did not constitute concurrency. The
researchers used multiple regression techniques to determine if concurrency predicted cost
growth and found no evidence to support the relationship (Birchler et al., 2011).
Although Birchler et al. (2011) found no evidence that concurrency was correlated with
cost growth, their database was much smaller than our database—consisting of only 28
programs. This leads us to believe they may not have had enough power to detect correlation.
Additionally, we can evaluate concurrency as a possible predictor for schedule, even though
Jimenez’s research did not find that it was highly predictive of schedule, as we also expand this
database and analyze more programs than Jimenez.
Foreman (2007) researched methods to further cost and schedule growth estimation by
including longitudinal variables that account for changes that take place over time. The research
conducted by Foreman et al. uses previous research conducted at AFIT in the early 2000’s by
Sipple et al. (2004), Genest & White (2005), Lucas (2004), and others by utilizing the database
built and added to by these researchers and analyzing additional predictor variables. Most
importantly, the researchers found that the length between MS-III (synonymous with MS-C) and
IOC, as well as a binary variable for MS-III slip (indicating whether or not the MS-III date
occurred later than originally planned), to be predictive and positively correlated to cost growth
in a program (Foreman, 2007). These indicate to us that schedule overruns, particularly later in a
program, may correlate to higher costs.
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Sipple et al. (2004) conducted a study to explore defense acquisition program cost growth
using SAR data from 1990 to 2000 for programs from all defense departments. The focus of this
research is on cost growth as it applies to the Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD)
phase, or between MS-B and MS-C, of an acquisition program. This research is further limited
by focusing solely on engineering cost growth within this phase. Applying a multiple regression
analysis to the programs that experience cost growth within their dataset, Sipple et al. developed
a model that predicts the expected amount of cost growth with an adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2 value of .4645. It

is important to note that the data for the response variable, engineering % (overrun), does not

follow a normal distribution and the researchers transformed it using a log-normal transformation
to achieve desirable results. This allowed the researchers to use the variable in the model while
passing the assumption of normality, a key assumption in the development of regression models
as we discuss in Chapter III. The researchers found that variables pertaining to schedule had the
most predictive ability of the 78 independent predictor variables analyzed in the study (Sipple et
al., 2002).
From this study, we are able to take two main findings to further our own research. Most
importantly, we learn what variables performed well to predict program cost and can explore
using them in our own research. The most predictive variables were found to be as follows:
maturity from MS-II (synonymous with MS-B), not using a major military contractor (i.e. not
using Lockheed-Martin, Northrup Grumman, Boeing, Raytheon, Litton, or General Dynamics),
and program acquisition unit cost (Sipple et al., 2002). This being said, there are a total of 78
predictive variables explained by this research which we can use to explore cost growth in our
research.
Secondly, we find further evidence that schedule seems to be a major driver of cost in
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DoD acquisition programs. This leads us to believe that the same variables used to predict
schedule may be used to predict cost since they appear to be so intimately entwined.
Additionally, this drives our belief moving forward into our analysis that there is a positive
correlation between cost and schedule.
Relationship Between Cost and Schedule
The ability to combine two of the three sides of the acquisition program triangle, cost and
schedule, into a comprehensive and usable tool for the acquisition community at large allows
program managers to identify the programs that may have a higher risk of overrunning cost and
schedule estimates. It is generally accepted knowledge that there exists a trade-space within the
triangle that every program is confined to, yet no studies exist, to our knowledge, which attempt
to quantify or analyze how any two of the different facets of the triangle interact outside of one
NASA study. We fill this gap with our research using the cost and schedule analyses to
determine how they interact. The following are the only prior research efforts to analyze cost
and schedule in the same study.
In August 2014, at the annual NASA Cost Symposium, Burgess Consulting, Inc. gave a
presentation titled Integrated Estimating Relationships in which they tie together three main
aspects of NASA programs in order to predict the probability of a program accomplishing its
cost or schedule goal. The research studies the interaction between the integrated relationships
between cost estimating, schedule estimating, and mission phasing. Mission phasing is the
outlay profile of the program, which corresponds to when funding is actually spent. A total of 37
NASA programs were used in the study and multiple regression models were developed to
analyze the relationships between the three variables (Burgess & Krause, 2014)
Three estimating relationships were quantified by this study: Phasing estimating
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relationship (PER), Cost estimating relationship (CER), and Schedule estimating relationship
(SER). The PER is the outlay profile of the program, quantifying how front-loaded or backloaded the funding is. The CER is the total program cost from the system requirements review
(SRR), a date that occurs prior to MS-B, through launch; while the SER is the time, in months,
from SRR to launch. Each of these variables is computed using a multiple-regression equation to
estimate the output based on four independent inputs. Unfortunately, since each input is specific
to space acquisitions, and not found in all programs outside of space acquisition, we cannot
analyze any of the variables in our own research. From this analysis, a set of tools was
developed to give decision makers the ability to quantify trade-offs between cost, schedule, and
phasing in their program. Additionally, this analysis allows the program manager to conduct a
programmatic “health assessment” in which the estimating relationships are analyzed to
determine if they fall within a standard deviation of the mean observed historical value (Burgess
& Krause, 2014). Our research follows closely in line with their trade-off analysis.
The trade-off analysis conducted in this research relies on conditional analysis and
normal probability curves. This research has developed a tool to predict the probability of a
program meeting one of the estimating relationships given the other two. An example given in
the presentation is “Given my project’s budget profile & cost estimate, what is the probability it
will be ready for launch by the need date?” (Burgess & Krause, 2014:14). From this research we
can take a great deal of information to be used in our own. Conditional analysis is something
that can be applied to our own research in order to add an additional layer of analysis for use by
the decision maker. While this research is very similar to ours, there are many important
differences. There are relatively few parallels that we can draw between space programs and the
programs in our database, mainly regarding program constraints and unit quantity, meaning that
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our analysis is vastly different from theirs. Additionally, we only use cost and schedule, we do
not use program phasing in this research.
The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) has conducted research for the DoD in various
capacities. We identify two specific studies pertaining to cost and schedule trends from their
pool of research. The primary study, conducted in 1989, specifically analyzed the effectiveness
of acquisition initiatives that were present at the time. This research consisted of 82 programs,
gathered from SARs, which met the main criteria of the research team of not being recent starts.
The researchers used a regression analysis to determine which variables had the largest
significant impact on cost growth. They found that development schedule growth, development
schedule length, and production stretch (defined as procuring the same quantity over a longer
period than planned) were the major drivers of total program cost growth (Tyson, Nelson, Om, &
Palmer, 1989). This research stands as a prime example of program schedule driving costs.
The second study, conducted in 1994, expands upon the initial study from 1989 to
identify cost and schedule growth patterns. According to their research, longer schedules mean
higher costs, and cost growth made systems less affordable while simultaneously eroding
congressional support. This study consisted of tactical missiles, tactical aircraft, and included 82
programs analyzed between Milestone II (currently referred to MS-B) and IOC (Tyson, Harmon,
& Utech, 1994). Our main takeaway from this research is the relationship between schedule
growth and cost growth. Tyson et al. (1994) developed two multiple regression models; one for
tactical missiles and one for tactical aircraft, which use schedule and aspects of unit cost to
predict total acquisition cost. While this research analyzes cost and schedule together, the
schedule is not analyzed as a separate model, but, rather, is a variable to predict total cost
growth. This suggests to us that there is a positive correlation between schedule growth and cost
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growth.
Summary
This review of relevant literature notes that there have been numerous studies performed
before ours that help direct our efforts. What we have uncovered has shed light on the many
methodologies that have been employed, as well as their findings under each aspect of our
research. With the knowledge of prior research, we are able to confidently identify our starting
point and strategy moving forward to our methodology.
One finding is clear after conducting this review; there is very little research linking
together two of the most important aspects of a program into one analysis: the program’s cost
and schedule. By reviewing the literature, we now know that there is this need in the community
and we can fill it. We gained the insight into how to structure our methodology, which is
covered in detail in the ensuing chapter.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
In this chapter, we discuss the procedures used to conduct our research in seven separate
sections. We begin with a discussion of our database—to include data sources, compilation, and
assumptions. From there we move into defining our response variable for program cost. Next,
we discuss the pursuit of predictor variables for cost and set the stage for how they are analyzed
and selected. Then we discuss the multiple regression technique we use and experiment-wise
error rate we accept. Afterwards, we outline the tests and procedures we must conduct to ensure
our predictive model is stable and applicable to the data analyzed. From there we discuss the
validation of our model and the reinsertion of the validation pool to create the final models.
Lastly, we outline how we analyze the programs logistically to predict cost and schedule
threshold overruns.
Database
To conduct our analysis, we first utilize the database built by Jimenez et al. (2016) in our
study, as we build upon the research he conducted here at AFIT. We build upon the database
employed in 2016 by using SAR data and filling in missing critical data points through data
inquiries on the internet, specifically through the Air Force Magazine and Deagel.com, and using
correspondence through the program offices at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB). In
this section we identify what we use to identify and collect program data before outlining
inclusion and exclusion requirements for our database. We continue by detailing how our
complete database is populated; building off prior research as well as the additional research we
conduct ourselves. We then touch on the use of a validation pool for our research before
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discussing several key assumptions we make regarding data collection and inclusion.
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Data
This research uses SAR data almost exclusively to populate the database we analyze and
make inferences from. According to the DAU, the SAR is a comprehensive summary status
report of a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) and is required for periodic
submission to Congress; it includes key cost, schedule, and technical information in a standard
format. Entry into the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR)
system is controlled, as it includes both classified and unclassified programs; therefore, for
national security reasons, this research only includes unclassified information. The programs
included within the database represent those of the highest interest to the government and
public.
As noted by previous research discussed in the literature review, the data contained
within the SARs is frequently used by the DoD to research cost and schedule growth in the
acquisition environment. The database and reporting instructions for the SARs have been
improved upon over the decades since its inception; however, prior research still notes difficulty
in using the data. Most recently Jimenez et al. (2016) had to filter 80 programs from the
database due to missing information regarding IOC alone—a very important program date.
Research conducted into the shortfalls of the SAR database was conducted by Hugh (1992) to
identify the issues and potential causes for those issues. The researchers identified the most
notable problems to be exclusion of significant elements of cost and constantly changing
guidelines, among others. Hugh (1992) concludes, however, that even though SAR data have a
number of limitations, they are suitable for identifying broad based trends across program. With
this in mind, the SAR database remains an appropriate source of data for the research we
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conduct.
Inclusion Criteria
The inclusion criteria for this research is any program in the DoD, to include all service
branches, which have reported program information using program SARs. Additionally, this
research focuses on only programs which are unclassified and reportable in the DAMIR
database. These include high interest defense acquisition programs spanning from the 1960’s to
today.
Exclusion Criteria
This research has three exclusion criteria for the first portion of our analysis, as well as a
fourth criteria that is applied only to the logistic analysis portion of this research. Each criteria
is imperative to this research in order to create a robust and useful tool for use in the acquisition
community. The criteria are outlined in detail in this section. Tables depicting the exclusion
criteria, as well as the number of programs removed due to each criterion, are detailed in
chapters four and five of this thesis.
The first exclusion criterion is that the program must contain a MS A date in the
schedule portion of the SAR as well as contain corresponding cost information for MS-A. It is
important to note that an exception to this is criteria is specifically detailed in the Key Data
Assumptions portion of this chapter. The purpose of this exclusion criterion is to ensure that
programs include information for three important predictor variables: MS-A to MS-B Duration,
RDT&E $ (M) at MS-B Start, and % RDT&E Funding at MS-B Start. These variables are
defined in Appendix B.
The second exclusion criteria is that the program SAR must contain a MS B date and
corresponding funding information. This again pertains to the necessity of containing pre-MS
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B data as a means to build a highly predictive model. Without the MS B date and funding
information, we are unable to ascertain the duration of MS A or the funding spent up to MS B.
Additionally, we are unable to calculate the projected funding needed to reach IOC, or the
projected duration of MS B to IOC.
The third exclusion criterion is that all program SARs must contain an IOC date that has
occurred prior to the latest reported SAR. We choose to include only these programs for
several reasons. First, Jimenez’s research uses IOC as a termination date for their predictive
model and, as one objective of our research is to re-validate the model developed in his
research, we continue to use this as the termination date. Second, the SAR database includes
information on all programs of great importance to congress, even if the program was
terminated. By requiring the programs we include to have an IOC date that occurs after the last
SAR report date, and corresponding cost information, we assure that each program is completed
at least up to this point. Third, Kozlak (2016) found that, on average, programs experienced
91% of their cost growth at IOC. While we do not know if this finding translates to schedule
growth being similarly realized at this point, it leads us to believe IOC may be a good
termination point for our schedule model. Additionally, by using IOC, our cost model has a
predictive termination point.
The fourth exclusion criterion, which is only applied to the logistic analysis of this
research, is that the program must have a SAR with a cost and schedule estimate within one
year of MS B. This is critical to our logistic regression analysis because it gives us the current
cost and schedule estimates, at MS B, to compare to the actuals at IOC. This, in turn, allows us
to use the numbers to determine whether the program experienced a significant or critical
overrun of their current MS B estimates and allows us to place them into “buckets” for analysis
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as explained later.
Database Population
Due to the dual nature of our research, we have two separate databases that are
analyzed, one being a subset of the other. We outline, in detail, how each database is populated
in Chapter IV and V of this thesis. The first database in Chapter IV includes 73 programs and
was populated using past research, most recently Jimenez et al. (2016), as well as program
SARs accessed through DAMIR. This database is built using three exclusion criteria. The
second database in Chapter V includes 49 programs and is a subset of the first database. This
database is built using four exclusion criteria.
Validation Pool
In order to test and validate that our multiple regression models perform the way they are
intended, and to ensure we did not erroneously build a predictive model that only predicts the
specific programs it was built on, we must randomly set aside 20% of the programs contained
within our database to test the models after they are built. This means that 15 programs are not
used to build the predictive models, but instead are used after the models are built to test how
accurately the models perform when applied to new data. We discuss how this test is
performed in detail in a later section. Once the model is validated against the validation pool
and found to be sufficient, these programs are re-inserted into the whole database and the model
is recreated using all programs to create the most representative model possible. It must be
noted that the logistic regression models do not follow this validation method due to the small
sample size.
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Key Data Assumptions
There are several key assumptions made throughout this data gathering process. The
most important assumption concerns the SAR not containing a Milestone A date outlined in the
program schedule. In this case, if the funding profile contains a funding date at least one year
prior to the start of Milestone B, we assume that Milestone A occurred in January of the earliest
funded year. January is identified as the most appropriate month because continuing resolution
authority (CRA) is a typical issue which the DoD has to contend with and, consequently,
programs are unable to spend funding if they are a new start (which is the definition of a
program at Milestone A) until a presidential budget is signed. This generally occurs in January,
instead of October, and programs are allowed to start spending funding and sign contracts
above what they were previously allocated. There are 15 programs in our database identified as
not having a Milestone A date, but having pre-Milestone B funding.
To track these programs, and to detect if they are statistically different from the other
programs in the database, we created a separate variable. This variable is called “no MS-A
date” and its sole purpose it to determine if these programs can be included in the research due
to this assumption.
Since many of the SARs within the database span different eras of DoD acquisition,
several milestones and requirements follow different naming conventions than we use today.
For our study, we consider Milestone II equal to Milestone B based on their corresponding
definitions and only refer to this point in the program’s life-cycle as MS-B in our study, which
is consistent with former studies (Harmon, 2012). The same holds true for Milestone I and III
being equivalent to Milestone A and C respectively.
We assume that, if the program created a prototype, it would be mentioned in that
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programs SAR. If a prototype is not mentioned, then it is assumed no prototype was created.
This is because whether or not a program created a prototype is not a required reporting item
and we have no other official data source to tell if one was ever created. Additionally, for
aircraft programs only, if first flight is prior to MS-B then it is assumed this first flight was
conducted by a prototype since research and development is not concluded at this point and that
first asset must be a “proof of concept” asset.
It is assumed that the SARs are not only accurate and representative, but also all
inclusive. This means that the programs identified in DAMIR as being applicable to this
research are not only representative of DoD programs in general, but are accurate and unbiased
by those who entered the information into the reports. It also means we assume all RDT&E and
Procurement costs are included in the data.
Response Variables
A response variable is the dependent variable in an equation; in our case, it is the variable
that we predict using several input, or predictor, variables. The costs within our database are
expressed in Millions of dollars ($M) and would be analyzed the same in our model if not for
the issue of homoscedasticity. As discussed in the ensuing chapter of this research, we must
transform our response variable using the natural log in order to reduce the high level of
variability in the cost of a program.
For our multiple regression model conducted in JMP®, our cost response variable is as
follows:
•

Cost from MS-B to IOC BY17 ($M) [Regression Output]
o This variable states the actual cost (both RDT&E and Procurement) from the
beginning of MS-B to IOC in BY17. This data is unavailable to the cost
estimator at the time they are developing a cost estimate. This variable is
transformed using a natural log and the output is re-transformed to give the
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median output as expanded upon later in this thesis.
For our Logistic regression models we use three separate response variables, analyzed
two ways each. The response variables will identify the programs that meet the requirements
for being considered in the given response. These variables are as follows:
•

Group I [Regression Output]
o This variable states that the program cost and schedule estimate at MS B is
within the threshold limit of the actual cost and schedule duration at IOC. There
are two thresholds analyzed, one being significant (15% over the current APB)
and the other is critical (25% over the current APB). This is used to label these
programs as not oing their current Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) threshold
when compared to the actual at IOC

•

Group II [Regression Output]
o This variable states that either the program cost or schedule estimate, but not
both, at MS B overruns the threshold limit of the actual cost or schedule duration
at IOC. There are two thresholds analyzed, one being significant (15%over the
current APB) and the other critical (25% over the current APB). This is used to
label the programs as overrunning only one, non-identified, threshold when
comparing their current APB versus the actual at IOC.

•

Group III [Regression Output]
o This variable states that bot the program cost and schedule estimate at MS B
overrun the threshold limit of the actual cost and schedule duration at IOC.
There are two thresholds analyzed, one being significant (15% over the current
APB) and the other critical (25% over the current APB). This is used to label the
programs as overrunning both thresholds when comparing the current APB to the
actual at IOC.
Predictor Variables
Leveraging the research we analyzed in our literature review we identify many candidate

predictor variables for predicting program cost which can then be used in the logistic analysis
for cost and schedule overruns. We recognize that the same variable may be found to be
predictive of both cost and schedule; as the models are calculated independently, this is of no
concern. It is imperative that the predictor variables contain a logical relationship to the
variable which they predict in order for the model to be of any use to the community. By
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following only logical leads, we maximize our chances of discovering causal relationships
instead of stumbling upon simple corollary predictors that are indefensible and a matter of
simple chance.
In order to protect against non-constant variance in the cost model, due to the large range
in dollar values present in the predictor variable, we analyze the histogram of program costs in
order to determine natural break points in the data. This allows us to discretize the data by
placing the programs into “bins” labelled as small, medium, large, and extra-large programs
depending on the break points determined in the data. In order to remove any researcher bias
from the analysis of the histogram, the interquartile values and the mean are used to determine
the values that are contained within each bin.
We clearly define each one of our predictor variables examined in this study, to include
the units, variable type, and, if necessary, how this variable is calculated or obtained. To be
included in our final regression model, described in detail in Chapters IV and V of this thesis,
the predictor variables must also demonstrate a level of significance using the Holm-Bonferroni
Correction technique at 𝛼𝛼 = .10 in addition to being logically related to the response variable.
Each predictor variable is found across all programs in our database. The predictor variables,
with definitions, are outlined in appendix B.
Multiple Regression Analysis
The culmination of the entire data gathering process is building the regression models to
predict the response variable. Analysis is performed individually for each model, and the
results are independent from one another. To begin this process we test the desired response
variable and include every predictor variable we have gathered following a mixed direction
stepwise regression analysis. We set our Type I error to be 0.1 in lieu of 0.05 as this research is
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more exploratory instead of explanatory. This technique allows us to identify the most
predictive variables that we have at our disposal immediately.
The variables are scrutinized by their individual p-values when determining which
variables to keep in the final model. We analyze them using the Holm-Bonferroni criteria,
which is a technique to ensure we do not violate the overall experiment error rate for the model;
again, our Type I error is 𝛼𝛼 = .10. This method allows us to avoid over-fitting our regression

output by including more predictor variables than are relevant without excluding others that are
borderline variables.
When analyzing the performance of a regression output, two particularly good measures
of how well the model performs are the 𝑅𝑅 2 and Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2 values. The 𝑅𝑅 2 , also known as the

coefficient of determination, is a measure of how well the model predicts the regression output.
In other words, it is a measure for how much variability present in the data is explained by the
regression equation. The Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2 value is a modified version of 𝑅𝑅 2 , the difference being
that Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 𝟐𝟐 accounts and adjusts for the number of predictor variables in the model.

These two outputs are what the performance of our models are judged by. A value of one
means that the model perfectly predicts the output and zero variability is left unexplained, while
a value of zero, conversely, means that there is no predictive capability in the model and 100%
unexplained variability present. Naturally, the aim of this research is to obtain 𝑅𝑅 2 and Adjusted
𝑅𝑅 2 values as close as possible to one.

Once the variables are finalized, we build the model, use the outputs to perform the

requisite tests identified, and subsequently validate the model as described later in this chapter.
The model is only valid for the purposes of this research if it passes all identified tests and is
validated by the validation pool using the identified techniques. We follow this process for
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both the schedule and the cost model.
Checks and Tests Performed
In order to build relevant and statistically significant multiple regression models, several
statistical tests must be performed and techniques must be applied. By performing the
following tests, which we overview in this section and apply in Chapter IV, we ensure that our
model is robust. These tests are performed after a suitable regression model is created; their
purpose is to validate that the model is statistically sound and that it is applicable to the data
used to create the model by isolating and examining any peculiarities in the data that may
invalidate our model.
Variance Inflation Factors
Once the model is built, the analysis commences with analyzing the variance inflation
factor (VIF) scores of each predictor variable that is deemed statistically significant. The VIF
measures how much multicollinearity has increased the variance of an estimate, meaning that it
measures and indicates the magnitude that a single predictor variable influences the outcome of
a multiple-regression model (Stine, 1995).
Cook’s Distance
This test is used to detect overly influential data points within the dataset that are possibly
skewing the results. Cook’s Distance is commonly used in multiple regression analysis to
interpret each data point’s influence on the regression results and can easily highlight outliers
through a graphical interface and a corresponding “score” for each data point between 0 and 1.
An overly-influential data point can be potentially harmful in a regression model, due to the fact
that it over-fits the regression output to include that one instance. In essence, it influences the
model to behave more like the one observed outcome than the population as a whole. When
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utilizing Cook’s Distance, we are alerted to any possible points which need to be analyzed more
closely by a score of between .1 and .5. It is probable cause for removal of a data point if the
Cook’s Distance score is greater than .5—meaning that the model is entirely dependent on that
one point and may not be applicable to any future scenarios (Cook, 1977). This would clearly
render our model useless to the acquisition community.
Studentized Residuals
The histogram of the studentized residuals is analyzed to detect any potential outliers in
the data. For our research, any data is considered to be a potential outlier if the studentized
residual is greater than three standard deviations from the mean. This prompts us to analyze the
points further to determine if there is an issue with the data, such as a transcription error or a
program, which is not properly accounted for in our data set, and can indicate that a data point
may be removed. Any points that reside three or more standard deviations from the mean are
analyzed, and their inclusion or removal is discussed and defended in detail in Chapter IV.
Shapiro-Wilk’s Test
In order for our multiple regression models to be valid and, therefore, useful to the
community they are designed to serve, they must pass the Shapiro-Wilk’s (S-W) test of the
assumption of normality. The S-W tests whether the residuals in our set come from a normal
distribution or not. The assumption that the residuals come from a normally distributed
population is one of two key assumptions to building a regression model and, if our models do
not pass this test, they are considered unusable to predict the outcomes. The null hypothesis for
the S-W test is that the residuals from our model are normally distributed; the alternative
hypothesis is that they are not. We test this at a threshold of α = .05. If the p-value for the test
is larger than .05, then we satisfy the assumption of normality for our models (Neter et al.,
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1996:111).
Breusch-Pagan Test
The second of the two key assumptions of any multiple regression model is that it
contains constant variance. The Breusch-Pagan (B-P) test is used to statistically prove whether
a model exhibits constant variance or not. In order for our models to be valid in predicting their
respective outcomes, the variance from the errors in the model must not be dependent on the
independent variables (Neter et al., 1996:239). This test is used to determine whether
heteroscedasticity is present in the model, which identifies the variance in the model created as
being non-constant and, therefore, identifying an issue with using those predictor variables in
our model.
In order to pass the assumption of constant variance we use a p-value of α = .05,

meaning we must obtain an output from the B-P greater 0.05. This ensures our model is robust
and the variables we use are truly predictive of the output.
Validation of Models
The closing test for our model is to test it against the validation pool, which contains 20%
of the total programs analyzed, that was removed prior to beginning the multiple regression
analysis. To conduct the validation we must measure how well our model predicts the
individual outcomes of each program in the validation pool against the actual observed
outcomes. To do this we run the validation pool through the cost and schedule models to
collect the outputs. We analyze the Absolute Percent Error (APE) of each program’s outputs.
The APE is equivalent to:

𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
𝑂𝑂𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣

. From the APE values we calculate the

Mean APE (MAPE) and Median APE (MdAPE) values. We compare these values to the
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MAPE and MdAPE of the programs that the models were built on. They should be similar if
the models are predicting properly.
Once the values are compared an actuals by predicted bivariate plot is created for both
the validation pool as well as the model building pool. These plots are analyzed for behavioral
consistency between the two data pools. If they pass scrutiny then the predictive models are
complete; the data pools are combined and the final models are created.
Combination of Cost and Schedule
The culmination of this research is to analyze the cost and schedule of a program from a
longitudinal standpoint. This means that we identify each program for meeting their cost and
schedule estimates, from MS B to IOC, compared to the actual cost incurred from MS B to IOC
using the threshold values identified in a Nunn-McCurdy breach. These breach thresholds are
15 and 25% when considering the estimate at MS B to be the current APB.
We analyze these programs and their outputs based on four categories. Each threshold is
analyzed independent of the other and, while one is a subset of the other, we do not analyze
them simultaneously. Programs enter into each category based whether their MS B estimates
overrun the actual multiplied by the threshold. The first group includes programs that have not
overrun either schedule or cost. The second group includes only programs that have overrun
either cost or schedule, but not both. The final group includes programs that have overrun both
cost and schedule. What this allows us to do is analyze and identify common factors inherent in
each program that may lead them to be included in either group. The application of this
knowledge allows decision makers to identify potential problem programs as well as potential
over performers. There is also the potential to identify characteristics that may lead to only a
cost or only a schedule overrun, but not both.
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To conduct our logistic regression analysis, we not only have to identify which bins each
program belongs to, we must transform each continuous variable into a nominal variable,
coding the positive response with a one and the negative response with a zero. This simplifies
the analysis and application of the logistic models, allowing us to readily interpret the odds
ratios. To do this, we analyze each continuous variable for the programs contained in each bin
separately to identify points that indicate a trend in the data. This process is explained in
further detail in Chapter V of this thesis.
Summary
Using the findings in our literature review, we built a set of predictor variables that form
the backbone of our analysis. This enables us to intelligently defend the use of variables we
find predictive of either response variable and argue a logical link between them. We outlined
our collection of data in order to develop a more robust dataset and ensure applicability to a
wider user community. We also provide systematic instructions for the data analysis and
model-building process, which enables the process to be reconstructed while also defending our
procedures. In Chapter IV, we put the theory into action to demonstrate the results of our cost
model analysis. In Chapter V we use the estimates and thresholds to categorize the programs
and use logistic regression to calculate the probability of a program identifying with each
group. In Chapter VI we discuss our results and how they answer our research questions, as
well as what our recommendations are for using this research and any future research, related to
this research, that should be accomplished.
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Modeling Median Will-Cost Estimates for Milestone B to IOC in Defense Acquisition
Programs

Abstract

The introduction of “should cost” in 2011 requires all Major Defense Acquisition
Programs to create efficiencies and improvements to reduce a program’s “will-cost” estimate.
Realistic “will-cost” estimates are a necessary condition for the “should cost” analysis to be
effectively implemented. Due to the inherent difficulties in establishing a program’s will-cost
estimate, we propose a new method to infuse realism into this estimate. Using historical data
from 73 Department of Defense programs as recorded in the Selected Acquisition Reports, we
utilize mixed stepwise regression to predict a program’s cost from Milestone B (MS B) to initial
operational capability (IOC). Our presented model explains 83% of the variation in program
acquisition cost. Significant predictor variables include: projected duration (months from MS B
to IOC); the amount of Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding spent at
the start of MS B; whether the program is considered a fixed wing aircraft; whether a program is
considered an electronic system program; whether a program is considered ACAT I at MS B;
and program size relative to the total program’s projected acquisition costs at MS B.
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Modeling Median Will-Cost Estimates for Milestone B to IOC in Defense Acquisition
Programs

Introduction

On June 15, 2011 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, &
Logistics (USD (AT&L)) directed the Military Departments and Directors of Defense Agencies
via a memorandum (see Appendix A) to implement Will-Cost and Should-Cost management for
all Acquisition Category (ACAT) I, II, and III programs. In this memorandum, the USD
(AT&L) reiterates that the Departments will continue to set program budget baselines using nonadvocate Will-Cost estimates. A Will-Cost estimate uses traditional cost estimating techniques
(e.g. analogy, bottom-up, parametric, etc.) to estimate the most-likely cost of a program in order
to establish a reasonable budget baseline and acquisition program thresholds. However, the USD
(AT&L) also “challenges program managers to drive productivity improvements into their
programs during…program execution by conducting Should-Cost Analysis,” which involves,
“identifying and eliminating process inefficiencies and embracing cost savings opportunities.”
(Carter & Mueller, 2011, p. 16). The Should-Cost estimate therefore deviates below the WillCost estimate to develop a realistic price objective for negotiation purposes and subsequent
savings against the Will-Cost estimate.
Additionally, the USD (AT&L) states in the same memorandum that, “the main problem
with the will-cost estimate isn’t in the numbers or how it was reached; the problem is that once
the will-cost estimate is derived and the budget for the program is set, historically, this figure
becomes the “floor” from which costs escalate, rather than a “ceiling” below which costs are
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contained—in many ways creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of budgetary excess.” (Carter &
Mueller, 2011, p. 16). We suggest that perhaps there is a better way to infuse realism into a
Will-Cost estimate such that it becomes a middle of the road estimate from which to work from
in the Should-Cost approach rather than the floor.
Therein lies the crux of the problem; how does one go about generating a median ‘WillCost’ estimate? Defense acquisition programs expand the frontiers of today’s technology to
develop new and innovative systems that provide an asymmetric advantage on the battlefield.
As a result, there are inherent uncertainties and risks associated with Department of Defense
(DoD) acquisitions. These realities are manifested in the derivation of the program’s cost
estimate. To combat risk and uncertainty, cost analysts tend to err on the side of caution and
unnecessarily inflate the cost estimate to capture more of the risk. This method needlessly ties
up precious resources that may be better placed elsewhere. By contrast, building an overly
aggressive cost estimate may free up resources to be placed elsewhere. However if this estimate
is exceeded, decision makers could take critical funding from other programs or force a program
manager to delay the program until additional funding can be secured.
In order to combat these issues, programs should strive for a realistic, middle ground
point—essentially an empirically validated baseline. The use of historical data allows the
acquisition community to unbiasedly analyze and to estimate what a program would cost in
relation to other similarly completed programs. This estimate then becomes a powerful tool
from which the user can identify a target cost for a given program. This estimate also serves as a
benchmark to identify whether a cost estimate is reasonable given what has occurred in the past.
From this estimate, mitigation of risks associated with over- and under-estimating program costs
may be achieved resulting in a more efficient allocation of resources. Thus, we propose a new
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empirically-based model for determining Will-Cost estimates in DoD acquisition programs.

Past Research and Database Creation

Our research is intended to build an empirically derived model to predict median WillCost estimates for DoD acquisition programs. We utilize prior research to identify potential
explanatory variables in our model and establish the basis for creating our dataset. Our literature
review spans the change in acquisition taxonomy from Milestone I, II, III to Milestone A, B, C.
For this study, we consider Milestone I, II, and III to be equivalent to Milestone A, B, and C,
respectively. This is consistent with prior literature findings that the naming convention has
simply altered over time without tangible changes in definition or substance (Harmon, 2012;
Jimenez, White, Brown, Ritschel, Lucas, & Seibel, 2016). Prior to relaying our data collection
process, we first discuss recent studies pertinent to our research. Using these studies, we build
the foundation for how we conduct our research into the relative program characteristics that
predict program cost.
Jimenez et al. (2016) developed a schedule duration prediction model for defense
acquisition programs using pre-MS B data; we leverage their research to identify explanatory
variables for investigation and an initial dataset from which to draw upon. Their analysis
concluded the following variables were significant in establishing an empirical benchmark for
“Should Schedule” estimates: amount of RDT&E dollars (in millions) at MS B start, the percent
of RDT&E funding at MS B start, whether a program is a modification, and whether a program
has a MS B start in 1985 or later to be significant variables. Although they explored and adopted
significant variables to predict program schedule using pre-MS B data, they also considered a

38

plethora of explanatory variables that were ultimately deemed statistically insignificant; we also
consider these variables.
Brown, White, Ritschel, & Seibel (2015) first identified the MS B start in 1985 or later as
an explanatory variable. They demonstrate that programs with a MS B start date in 1985 or later
have a statistically significant change in their expenditure profile. These programs tend to
expend a greater percentage of their obligations by the program’s mid-point than the programs
that start prior to 1985. Although not conclusive, Brown et al. (2015) hypothesized that the
reason for this significant shift is due to the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
(often referred to as the Packard Commission) and the acquisition reforms that occurred due to
the recommendations of the commission.
Similar to Jimenez et al. (2016), Deitz, Eveleigh, Holzer, & Sarkani (2013) analyzed
acitivities prior to MS B. They examined the importance of developing a robust Analysis of
Alternatives prior to MS B and the effects that an analysis of this nature may have on program
success. Their findings suggest that while only 10% of a program’s lifecycle cost was invested
prior to MS B, 70% of a program’s lifecycle costs are committed by this milestone (Deitz et al.,
2013). This suggests to us that pre-MS B data may be very important to predicting program cost.
However, this also limits data collection because pre-MS B reporting is not mandatory for all
acquisition programs and therefore the cost and schedule data is unavailable in some instances.
Jimenez et al. (2016) also experienced such a limitation.
Looking slightly further back in the literature, we find other pertinent studies that present
possible explanatory variables to consider. Foreman (2007) researched methods to improve cost
and schedule growth estimates by including longitudinal variables that account for changes that
take place over time. His research built upon the database initially comprised by Sipple, White,
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& Greiner (2004) and subsequently modified by Lucas (2004) and Genest & White (2005).
Sipple et al. (2004) found the most important predictive variables of cost growth to be were MS
C to IOC duration and an indicator variable for a MS C slip.
The aforementioned researchers have identified numerous variables for investigation on
whether they will be predictive of program cost. The complete list is in Appendix B. This list
also gives us our data inclusion and exclusion criteria. The initial data inclusion criteria is any
program in the DoD (i.e., all service branches) which have reported program data using the
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR). Additionally, they must be unclassified and reported
within the Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) and pre-Major Defense Acquisition
Program (pre-MDAP) section of the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval
(DAMIR) database.
For a program to be considered in our study, it must satisfy three criteria; otherwise, it is
excluded for this research. The first requirement is that the program SAR must contain a MS A
date or funding at least one year prior to MS B – we interpret the pre-MS B funding as indicating
the year in which MS A may have occurred. This requirement is due to the pre-MS B data being
found predictive in the literature review. Unfortunately, this requirement also results in a great
deal of programs being ineligible for inclusion because a lack of reporting requirements prior to
MS B. This is not unexpected considering a program is not official until meeting MS B.
We are able to include 15 programs in our dataset by making the following assumption
when there is no MS A date provided: if there is funding in the funding profile at least one year
prior to MS B, then MS A occurred in January of the year in which funding was first received.
We test this assumption to ensure they are not statistically different from the others prior to
inclusion in the final dataset; as we’ll see in the methodology section, they are deemed
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statistically equivalent.
The second exclusion criteria is that the program SAR must contain a MS B date and
corresponding funding information. This again pertains to the necessity of containing pre-MS B
data as a means to build a highly predictive model. Without the MS B date and funding
information, we are unable to ascertain the duration of MS A or the funding spent up to MS B.
Additionally, we are unable to calculate the projected funding needed to reach IOC or the
projected duration of MS B to IOC.
The third exclusion criteria is that the program SAR must contain an IOC date that
occurred prior to the last reported SAR which indicates that the program is complete up to IOC.
This is important to our research as it gives us a termination point to estimate and ensures we are
not using projected values as actuals in our model. IOC is a very important date in a program as
it signifies the point in time when the user community can first begin to realize the benefits from
the investment in the program.
As previously discussed, our dataset starts with the 56 programs in the database built by
Jimenez et al. (2016). We augment this database by analyzing defense program SARs from the
DAMIR system.. The program SARs contain program funding, schedule, and performance
information relative to our research. Using our stated inclusion criteria, we add 187 programs to
the initial 56. Then using the exclusion criteria, we remove 170 programs for a net change of 17;
this results in a final program count of 73. Table 1 demonstrates inclusion and exclusion criteria
used in this research. The list of all included programs is located in Appendix C.
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Table 1: Program Inclusion / Exclusion Criteria and Counts
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria

Programs Added

Program Removed

Program Count

Jimenez’s Starting Database

56

56

DAMIR Query and Addition

187

243

Double Count Adjustment

29

214

IOC Occurs after Last SAR

61

153

Missing Milestones A or B

74

79

Missing IOC

4

75

Classified

2

73

Total Remaining

73

The data that we use for our analysis includes both actuals and projected values from the
SARs. We use the latest available program’s SAR to record the actual cost from MS B to IOC as
the response variable in the model. In order to develop a useful predictive tool for the
acquisition community, we must only use projected cost and schedule data at MS B since this is
the only data the user of our regression model will have at their disposal at that time. This
limitation ensures that we are not overly influencing our model by using data which will be
unavailable to the user when they predict the actual program cost.
In order to implement this limitation, we retrieve projected cost and schedule data from the
SAR corresponding to the year in which MS B occurred or, if that SAR is unavailable, the
earliest available SAR. This allows us to use projected values to predict a program’s cost from
MS B to IOC, the same as if we were in a program office attempting to estimate the cost of our
program independent of this research.

Methodology

To arrive at the presented model (explained in the next section), we use a mixed direction
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stepwise approach to screen for the most predictive variables, and then finalize the model using
ordinary least squares (OLS). For our regression model, the response variable is the natural log
of the acquisition cost (defined as the RDT&E and Procurement costs) from MS B to IOC. We
transform the response variable using a natural log function in order to mitigate against
heteroscedasticity due to the large range of actual costs—without transforming the OLS
residuals, we would have failed the assumption of constant variance at a level of significance of
0.05. To ascertain the actual cost estimate from the OLS model we re-transform the predicted
output back to actual cost (in millions of BY 17 dollars) by calculating eOLS Output . This
transformed model results in a median estimate of Will-Cost since this back-transformation
equates to the median in the original space (Carroll & Rupert, 1981; Tisdel, 2006).
As noted earlier, Appendix B lists and defines the predictor variables analyzed—recall that
the predictor variables must be available to the cost estimator and relevant to program cost in
order to be considered in this research. As such, only actual data is used up to MS B, and
projections are used after MS B. In order to be included as an explanatory variable, it must have
occurred in at least one of the 73 programs in our database. Additionally, to eliminate the effects
of inflation we convert all funding variables to BY17 using the 2016 OSD inflation indices.
We use JMP® Pro 12 for our statistical analyses and adopt an initial overall experiment
wise Type I error of 0.1 due to the exploratory nature of this study. To be consistent with this
level of significance, we use a p-value threshold of 0.1 to enter and exit the mixed direction
stepwise regression model. Once the initial variables are identified by the stepwise procedure,
we then use OLS to finalize the regression model. We now lower the overall Type I to be 0.05
and require each predictor variable to be statistically significant according to the Holm–
Bonferroni method, which counteracts the problem of multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).
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Prior to conducting the variable selection procedure, we randomly select 20%, or 15, of
the 73 programs and set these aside for utilization as a validation set. We use the remaining 58
programs for the stepwise and OLS regression analysis. After validating our selected model, we
perform another mixed stepwise analysis using the entire dataset of 73 programs to determine if
we inadvertently left out a predictive variable.
For our model to be considered viable, we must verify the standard OLS assumptions.
First, we use only one final SAR per program to record the actual cost and schedule information
in addition to an earlier SAR for that program to ascertain the projected information—this
assures independence. To assess the assumptions of homoscedasticity and normality of model
residuals, we conduct a Breusch-Pagan (B-P) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) test, respectively, at a
level of significance of 0.05. To assess multicollinearity between the predictor variables we
examine their variance inflation factors (VIF). The VIF score must be below 10 in order for us
to say with confidence that multicollinearity is not a factor in our model. To guard against a
program being overly influential to the outcome, we employ Cook’s Distance. A Cook’s D
value greater than 0.5 indicates the model is being overly influenced by a variable in one of the
programs (Neter, Kutner, & Nachtsheim, 1996, p. 381).
After all the underlying model assumptions are assessed and passed, we test our resultant
model against the validation pool using descriptive and inferential measures. Regarding
descriptive measures, we compute the absolute percent error (APE), which is the absolute
difference between the true cost between MS B and IOC and the predicted cost divided by the
true cost for each program. Note, the true and predicted costs are evaluated in the natural log
space. Using these APE values, we then calculate the median and mean APEs (MdAPE and
MAPE, respectively). We calculate these for both the validation and modeling programs and
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compare the values. Finally, we investigate whether the untransformed predicted values truly
reflect the median value or a baseline estimate for Will-Cost by investigating how the true
program cost compare to the predicted program cost.

Analysis

Using mixed stepwise regression on the modeling set of 58 programs, we develop a
preliminary model—Table 2 highlights this model. The presented model has an R2, which
represents the amount of variability in the data explained by the model, of 0.82. We calculate the
APE values for this model which results in an MdAPE and MAPE of 0.050 (5.0%) and 0.059
(5.9%), respectively, for the model building set. For the validation set, we obtain an MdAPE and
MAPE of 0.056 (5.6%) and 0.079 (7.9%), respectively. Although the validation set is slightly
higher than the model building set, all of the absolute percent errors are less than 10% suggesting
the model is performing well.

Table 2: Preliminary Ordinary Least Squares Model
Predictor Variable

Estimate

P-Value

Variance

Estimate

Inflation Factor

N/A

N/A

Intercept

5.731

Projected MS B to IOC (months)

0.0114

0.0033

0.199

1.13

RDT&E $ at MS B Start

0.00029

0.0003

0.297

1.56

Fixed Wing

0.620

0.0037

0.199

1.17

−0.732

0.0142

−0.216

1.96

ACAT I

0.837

0.0346

0.160

1.47

Large Program

0.747

0.0018

0.251

1.58

Extra Large Program

1.205

< 0.0001

0.397

2.16

Electronic System Program

< 0.0001

Standardized
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With respect to the inferential measures, Table 2 reveals that all VIF scores are below or
close to two indicating little to no evidence for multicollinearity. The preliminary model also
contains no Cook’s D score above 0.50 (highest value is approximately 0.10). This suggests no
overly influential data points affecting the p-values of our explanatory variables. Model
residuals pass both assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity with p-values of 0.25 and
0.92 for the S-W and B-P tests, respectively. Lastly, all explanatory variables are individually
significant at the comparison-wise error rate under the Holm–Bonferroni criteria (Holm, 1979).
With the model being deemed internally valid, we combine all the data together to update
model parameter values using OLS and lowering the overall Type I error rate to 0.05. Table 3
shows the updated model. Stepwise failed to detect any additional predictor variables (at the
overall familywise error rate of 0.05 level of significance) and the resultant model described in
the next section is our final model. The resultant model has an R2 of 0.83 with an MdAPE and
MAPE of 0.057 (5.7%) and 0.062 (6.2%), respectively. This means that the presented model
has a relative error of between 5.7% and 6.2% of predicting the natural log of the program cost
from MS B to IOC. After back-transforming to the original values of program cost from MS B
to IOC, approximately 50.7% of the 73 programs in our database had a true program cost
exceeding the predicted cost while 49.3% had less. Theoretically, this ratio should be 50% /
50%. The empirical percentages suggest our presented model is performing as expected.
To prevent model extrapolation, the ranges in which this model is useful for the two
continuous variables must be consistent with the bounds of the programs used within our
analysis. For projected duration from MS B to IOC the lower bound is 28 months while the
upper bound is 129 months. For RDT&E funding ($M) at MS B Start (BY17), the lower bound
is $4.43M while the upper bound is $5979.4M. Using this model outside of these ranges will
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invalidate the results. We now discuss the statistically significant predictor variables. All of
these variables are available to the cost estimator at the time the estimate is calculated (which is
intended to be post-MS B).

Table 3: Final Ordinary Least Squares Model
Predictor Variable

Intercept

5.449

Projected MS B to IOC (months)

P-Value

Standardized

Variance

Estimate

Inflation Factor

< 0.0001

N/A

N/A

0.0108

0.0021

0.170

1.09

RDT&E $ at MS B Start

0.00026

0.0007

0.220

1.50

Fixed Wing

0.561

0.0039

0.165

1.19

−0.635

0.0061

−0.191

1.77

ACAT I

1.151

< 0.0001

0.251

1.38

Large Program

0.758

0.0004

0.232

1.51

Extra Large Program

1.461

< 0.0001

0.439

2.12

Electronic System Program

•

Estimate

(Projected) MS B to IOC Duration—Continuous Variable
The parameter estimate of this variable is 0.0108 which is multiplied by the number of
months the program estimates to spend from MS B to IOC. This duration does not
necessarily correlate to the level of technology or technological maturity being employed,
but, rather, indicates the cost of time in DoD acquisition.

•

RDT&E Funding ($M) at MS-B Start (BY17)—Continuous Variable
The parameter estimate associated with this variable is 0.00026, which is multiplied by
the actual, non-transformed RDT&E funding spent prior to program entrance into MS B.
Since the amount of funding spent at this point is additive to total program cost, we
suggest that the amount of funding spent prior to MS B is indicative of the projected size
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and scope of the entire program. This variable could indicate a greater investment in
newer technology prior to MS B, which typically results in higher costs over the entire
program life due to integrating and further maturing this technology.

•

Fixed Wing—Binary Variable
The parameter estimate associated with this variable is 0.561 and will be multiplied by
one for every aircraft (excluding helicopters) program estimate conducted. The positive
parameter estimate indicates that aircraft programs sans helicopters appear to be more
expensive in general in contrast to other DoD platform programs. We hypothesize this
effect as an artifact of complexity associated with stealth, avionic, and engine capabilities
of today’s modern aircraft, regardless of branch of service.

•

Electronic System Program—Binary Variable
The parameter estimate associated with this variable is −0.635 and will be multiplied by
one for any program that is considered an electronic system program. The negative
parameter estimate indicates these programs are statistically significantly cheaper to
acquire than the other program types. Bolten, Leonard, Arena, Younossi, & Sollinger
(2008) also concluded that electronic systems are historically cheaper.

•

ACAT I—Binary Variable
The parameter estimate for this variable is 1.151 and is multiplied by a value of one for
any program considered to meet ACAT I funding estimate requirements at the start of
MS B. This variable being additive to program cost is logical due to the nature of ACAT
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I programs and the dollar costs associated with these DoD acquisitions.

•

Large Program—Binary Variable
The parameter estimate for this variable is 0.758 and is multiplied by a one if the program
being estimated projects to have a total program acquisition cost greater than $7B (BY17)
(RDT&E and Procurement) from MS A to program conclusion but less than or equal to
$17.5B (BY17). This value is estimated at MS B and was calculated using the 50%
interquartile from a histogram analyzing total projected program acquisition cost. The
additive nature of this variable adjusts for large DoD acquisition programs.

•

Extra Large Program—Binary Variable
The parameter estimate for this variable is 1.461 and is multiplied by a value of one if the
program acquisition cost from MS A to IOC is projected to be greater than $17.5B
(BY17). This value is estimated at MS B and was calculated using the 75% interquartile
from a histogram analyzing total projected program acquisition cost. The additive nature
of this variable adjusts for the largest DoD acquisition programs, such as the F-35 and F22.

Discussion and Conclusion

Table 4 presents the relative percentage contribution of each variable included in the final
model. The smallest relative contribution is 9.9% for Fixed Wing aircraft while the largest
relative contribution is 26.3% for Extra Large programs. Besides these variables, there is low
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variation between the remaining predictor variables in the presented model. This suggests that
the explanatory variables are relatively similar with respect to affecting the true program
RDT&E and Procurement costs.

Table 4: Predictor Variables and Their Relative Contribution to the Model
Explanatory Variable

Relative Contribution

Projected MS B to IOC (months)

10.2%

RDT&E $ at MS B Start

13.2%

Fixed Wing

9.9%

Electronic System Program

11.5%

ACAT I

15.0%

Large Program

13.9%

Extra Large Program

26.3%

In addition to the significant predictor variables, it is also important to address the nonsignificant variables that were expected to contribute to our model analysis. The MS C Slip and
Duration From MS C to IOC variables that were found to be significant in predicting cost
growth by Foreman (2007) were not significant in predicting program cost from MS B to IOC.
This finding allowed us to include the three satellite programs in our database since they do not
have a MS C date within their SAR reports. Additionally, as was found by Jimenez et al.
(2016), we do not find any statistical significance in branch of service, and the only program
type that is statistically different is Electronic Systems. Lastly, modification, prototype,
concurrency planned, and MS B start date in 1985 or later were not found to be statistically
significant variables.
As with any statistical model, there are limitations to our regression model. Principally,
this model is based on data collected from SAR reports that sometimes contain incomplete
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information. Ultimately, the model is only as good as the data itself. The availability of preMS B data was a large constraint on the data building process and limited which programs
could be included. Additionally, the search parameters used in DAMIR may have inadvertently
removed useful programs from our study which might have influenced any number of other
variables to be significant.
One significant limitation is the high level of variability in the definition of IOC. Our
model uses IOC as a termination point due to the importance of this milestone in a program as
well as the availability of the date. In the programs we analyze, the number of units considered
for attaining IOC varies greatly. Achieving IOC is determined individually for each unique
program based on an initial cadre of operators, maintainers, and support equipment that can
employ and sustain the system in an operational environment. For programs like satellites,
submarines, and ships, IOC is generally considered to be very few, or even one single, unit. In
the case of missile programs, IOC could be in the hundreds. This drives a level of known
variability within our model that could be better accounted for by using a more structured and
universal definition for IOC; this could be a topic for future research.
Accurately predicting program cost is both an art and a science. Achieving accurate
estimates during the early stages of a program’s lifecycle is an unenviable task, and one can be
certain that the estimate will be wrong. However, deriving an estimate that is close to the final
actual cost is crucial to improving the allocation of scarce resources. What our model provides
is the empirical portion of the estimating process to ascertain the Will-Cost for a program. We
provide this tool to the DoD acquisition community primarily as a method to check the
assumptions and realism of their program office estimate. Being able to build a program cost
estimate and turn to our statistically built and tested model for validation will be invaluable for
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the community because it will allow for an injection of increased realism into the cost
estimating process. Realism in the Will-Cost median estimate is crucial to the success of
Should-Cost analysis.
Drawing a difference between our research and prior research, the most notable
difference is the model output. Our research and model focuses on building an empirically
based estimate for program cost between MS B and IOC in order to serve as a realistic
benchmark (the median value) for what programs Will-Cost. Program managers can then adopt
“should cost” efficiencies to reduce cost further. We believe that modeling an output that will
serve as an actual point estimate is valuable as a crosscheck tool for the user community. It
gives the user a benchmark based on historical data against which the program measures its
progress. The model also supports the “will-cost and should-cost” requirement levied in 2011
by providing an objective and defensible cost for what a program should actually cost based on
what has been achieved in the past. Ultimately, a quality will cost estimate provides a starting
point for program managers to examine processes and find efficiencies that lead to reduced
program costs.
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Appendix A: Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management
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Appendix B: Predictor Variables Investigated in this Paper
•

MS A to MS B Duration (Months) – Continuous Variable
o This variable indicates the total time it took in months for a program to
complete MS A to MS B according to the last SAR date. In this variable we
are only concerned with actual schedule duration data available to the cost
estimator at the time of MS B/EMD start.

•

Quantity Expected at MS B – Continuous Variable
o This variable indicates the estimate of total quantity of weapons systems
that were expected to be produced at MS B at the time of the last SAR
date.

•

RDT&E Funding ($M) at MS B Start (BY17) – Continuous Variable
o This variable is based on raw total RDT&E dollars (in millions) that were
allocated to the program prior to MS B. The dollars were all standardized
into the base year when the research began (BY17).

•

(Projected) % of RDT&E Funding at MS B Start (BY17) – Continuous Variable
o This variable is based on the percent of available RDT&E dollars
allocated to the program before, and up to the start of, MS B. While this
variable is based on a percentage, the dollars that this percentage was
derived from were all standardized into the base year when the research
began (BY17).

•

(Projected) Total Program Acquisition Cost (BY17) – Continuous Variable
o This variable is the total projected acquisition costs, from MS B to IOC,
estimated at MS B or the earliest available program SAR. It serves to
identify how large a program is projected to be in terms of cost.

•

Modification – Binary Variable
o This variable is identifies programs whose existence serves as a
modification to a pre-existing weapons system. If a weapons system is a
modification, it does not necessarily mean it will not have pre-MS B data
associated with it. Every program is different and, therefore, it cannot be
assumed that a modification will automatically start at MS B.

•

Prototype – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies programs that create a prototype, or prototypes,
of a weapons system before production of that weapons system begins.
More than one type of prototype for a weapons system can be created in
a given program.

•

Concurrency Planned – Binary Variable
o This variable addresses planned concurrency in a given program prior to
MS B. Concurrency is the proportion of RDT&E dollars that are authorized
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during the same years that Procurement appropriations are authorized. The
planned level of concurrency forces managers to make decisions that can
lead to [schedule] growth if either too much or too little concurrency is
accepted for a given program (Birchler, Christle, & Groo, 2011, p. 246).
•

1985 or Later for MS B Start – Binary Variable
o This variable accounts for a time series trend of programs that started their
MS B in 1985 or later. It is shown that programs which began development
during 1985 or later (considered “contemporary”) expend a greater
percentage of obligations by their schedule midpoint than the earlier pre1985 programs. We attribute this difference to the President’s Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense (commonly called the Packard Commission) and
the subsequent acquisition reforms.

•

Air Force – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Air Force.

•

Navy – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Navy.

•

Army – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Army.

•

Marine Corps – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Marine Corps.

•

Fixed Wing – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a fixed wing
aircraft program, regardless of service it is associated with. The criterion
to qualify as a fixed wing aircraft is for that weapons system to maintain
flight via fixed wings versus rotary wing flight.

•

Fighter Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a fighter
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Bomber Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a bomber
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.
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•

Helo Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a helicopter
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Cargo Plane Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a cargo plane
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Tanker Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a tanker plane
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Electronic Warfare Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is an electronic
warfare program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with. An electronic warfare program, as not to be confused with
an electronic system program, differs greatly in its main function(s). A
description from Lockheed Martin makes the distinction that it involves the
ability to use the electromagnetic spectrum – signals such as radio, infrared
or radar – to sense, protect, and communicate. At the same time, it can be
used to deny adversaries the ability to either disrupt or use these signals
(Electronic Warfare).

•

Trainer Plane Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a trainer plane
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Missile Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a missile program,
or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated with.

•

Electronic System Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is an electronic
system program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with. This differs greatly from the previously described
electronic warfare variable in that electronic systems programs are
principally concerned with the electronic user interface of a system,
avionics controls, or other similar applications that primarily support the
electronic usability of a system, or system of systems.

•

Submarine Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a submarine
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program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.
•

Ship Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a surface ship
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Satellite Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a satellite
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

ACAT I – Binary Variable
o This variable indicates if the program is an ACAT I program. This is
significant in that ACAT I programs deal with a much larger dollar amount
and thus are more susceptible to cost and schedule growth by way of their
large-scale and complexity efforts.

•

(Projected) MS C to IOC Duration (Months) – Continuous Variable
o This variable indicates the total estimated time for a program to meet IOC
from MS C according to the earliest available SAR estimate. This variable
has been found to be predictive of cost growth in the programs studied by
Foreman (2007). With this variable, we are concerned with giving the cost
estimator the ability to enter in the projected duration, in months, of the gap
between MS C and IOC to predict program cost.

•

(Projected) MS C Slip – Binary Variable
o This variable indicates whether the program projected date for meeting
IOC extends past the initial estimate. Foreman (2007) has found that a slip
in MS C is indicative of program cost growth in past research.

•

No MS A Date – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies whether a program did not contain a MS A date in
the schedule portion of the SAR, but did include funding at least one year
prior to MS B. This is used to identify these programs and test that they
are not statistically different from the other programs and is not used in a
predictive capacity.

•

Small Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies whether a program’s projected total acquisition
costs (RDT&E and Procurement) are below $3B. This value is determined
from analyzing the histogram of the (projected) total program acquisition
costs of the programs in our study and coincides closely with the 25%
value.
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•

Medium Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies whether a program’s projected total acquisition
costs (RDT&E and Procurement) are above $3B but below $7B. This
value is determined from analyzing the histogram of the (projected) total
program acquisition costs of the programs in our study and coincides
closely with the 25% to 50% range.

•

Large Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies whether a program’s projected total acquisition
costs (RDT&E and Procurement) are above $7B but below $17.5B. This
value is determined from analyzing the histogram of the (projected) total
program acquisition costs of the programs in our study and coincides
closely with the 50% to 75% range.

•

Extra Large Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies whether a program’s projected total acquisition
costs (RDT&E and Procurement) are above $17.5B. This value is
determined from analyzing the histogram of the (projected) total program
acquisition costs of the programs in our study and coincides with the 75%
value.

•

(Projected) % Complete at MS B Start – Continuous Variable
o This variable is motivated by the % RDT&E variable and serves to project
the percent that a program is complete, to IOC, when MS B occurs. It is
calculated by dividing the projected duration from MS B to IOC by the
sum of duration from MS A to IOC and projected duration from MS B to
IOC. This serves to indicate where the program managers believe the
program is in terms of schedule completeness. It could indicate program
maturity level.
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Appendix C: List of Programs Used in the Research Database
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Program
A-10
AWACS
C-17
F-22
AH-64
B-1B Computer Upgrade
C-5 RERP
F-15
B-1B JDAM
KC-135R
FA-18 A/B
AV-8B Harrier
S-3A
P-8 Poseidon
V-22 Osprey
E-2C Hawkeye
F-35 JSF
CH-47D Chinook
E-8A JSTARS
AGM-65A Missile
ALCM Missile
AMRAAM Missile
JASSM Missile
JDAM
JPATS T-6A
OTH-B
LGM-118 Peacekeeper
GBU-39 SDB-I
National Aerospace System
AGM-88 HARM
AIM-9X Block 1
AN/BSY-1
COBRA Judy Replacement
Harpoon Missile
NMT
SH-60B
UGM-96A Trident I Missile

Number
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

63

Program
SSN 774 (Virginia Class Sub)
T-45TS
UGM-109 Tomahawk
SSBN 726 SUB
AGM-114A Hellfire Missile
OH-58D Helicopter
AAWS-M Javelin
SSN 21 Sub
AWACS Blk 40-50 Upgrade
B-2 EHF Inc 1
C-5 AMP
MQ-9 Reaper
AH-64E Remanufacture
ATACMS-APAM
CH-47F
CSSCS (ATCCS)
Longbow Apache (AH-64D)
UH-60M Blackhawk
AESA
AGM-88E AARGM
CEC
E-2D AHE
JSOW
LCS
LHD-1
MH-60R
MH-60S
Strategic Sealift
Trident II
EA-6B ICAP III
JSIPS (CIGS)
NAS
AFATDS (ATCCS)
AEHF
EELV
WGS

V. Estimating the Likelihood of a Defense Acquisition Program Staying within Cost and
Schedule Bounds

Abstract

Program managers use prior experience to spot potential programmatic pitfalls and areas
of concern. Augmenting this experience with an empirical procedure, we present a method to
estimate the likelihood of a program exceeding two important schedule and cost thresholds: 1)
under 15 percent over the initial cost estimate from Milestone (MS) B to Initial Operating
Capability (IOC), and 2) 15 percent under the initial length (in months) between MS B and IOC;
the second bound being under 25% respectively with respect to cost growth and schedule
slippage. For our analysis, we use 49 Department of Defense programs. Using logistic
regression and odds ratios, we generally find that electronic system programs, extremely large
programs (exceeding $17.5B in Base Year 2017 dollars), programs procuring smaller quantities
of units, and programs with shorter schedules (less time from MS A to MS B and projected time
from MS B to IOC) experience smaller percentages of cost growth and schedule slippage.
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Estimating the Likelihood of a Defense Acquisition Program Staying within Cost and
Schedule Bounds

Introduction

In today’s fiscally constrained environment, we should use every tool at our disposal to
contain cost growth and schedule slippage. As good stewards of the taxpayer, it is our duty to
ensure that Department of Defense (DoD) programs are fielded on time and on budget. This also
includes being aware of program characteristics that may lead to future cost growth and/or
schedule slippage. To investigate this, we employ a statistical technique that is often adopted in
the biostatistical community–logistic regression. Using this technique, we identify cost and
schedule variables that may indicate a program will experience significant cost growth and/or
schedule slippage. Specifically, we consider cost and schedule growth levels consistent with the
Nunn-McCurdy significant and critical breach thresholds since these percentages have been
identified by leadership as being growth above and beyond anything that can be considered
acceptable.
With this in mind, we categorize defense acquisition programs based on their cost and
schedule performance at the time they meet Initial Operating Capability (IOC) versus what they
estimated at Milestone (MS) B. To this end, we consider a program to be “good” if they are
within a specified percentage of their estimated cost and schedule and “bad” if they are not. The
intent of our research is to ascertain what factors may be statistically significant in predicting the
probability at MS B that a DoD acquisition program will fall into either category. We use the
Nunn-McCurdy threshold of 15% over the current baseline as our cutoff point for “significant”
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growth (Schwartz & O’Connor, 2016). We replicate this process for increases of 25% and
consider those a “critical’ overrun.

Background and Database

To the best of our knowledge, the literature appears to be scant with DoD studies which
simultaneously analyze program cost and schedule performance. One exception is a National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) study (Burgess & Krause, 2014) that looked at
the interaction between the phasing estimating relationship (PER), the cost estimating
relationship (CER), and the schedule estimating relationship (SER). The CER is the total
program cost from the System Requirements Review (SRR), a date that occurs prior to MS B,
through launch; while the SER is the time, in months, from SRR to launch. Given these cost and
schedule estimates, the PER relays the annual funding profile for the program. They used
historical data from 37 NASA programs for their study and developed multiple regression
models to analyze these relationships.
From their analysis, they developed a set of tools to give decision makers the ability to
quantify trade-offs between cost, schedule, and phasing in their program. Additionally, Burgess
and Krause’s (2014) analysis allowed the program manager to conduct a programmatic “health
assessment” in which the estimating relationships are analyzed to determine if they fall within a
standard deviation of the mean observed historical value. Our research deviates from theirs in
that we analyze categorical indicators for programs that fall under or over the 15% and 25%
current and original baseline thresholds. We aim to describe what indicators may correlate to a
program being deemed “good” or “bad” in the future based upon characteristics at MS B.
Before considering candidate variables that may be indicative of a DoD acquisition
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program being “good” or “bad”, we assume MS I, II, and III to be equivalent to MS A, B, and C,
respectively. This is based on their respective definitions and that the naming convention has
simply changed over time without a tangible change in definition or substance as noted by
Harmon (2012) and Jimenez, White, Brown, Ritschel, Lucas, and Seibel (2016).
From Burgess and Krause (2014), we find two predictive results: 1) longer duration from
SRR to Preliminary Design Review (PDR) suggests increased likelihood of program schedule
lengthening, and 2) higher percent of new designs appear to increase likelihood of increased cost
in acquisition programs. Jimenez et al. (2016) determined the following variables are
statistically significant for predicting increased schedule duration: whether a program is a new
effort or modification to an existing program, the amount of raw funding (adjusted for inflation)
prior to MS B for a program, and the percentage of total RDT&E (Research Development Test
and Evaluation) funding profile allocated at MS B. They also suggest that information obtained
prior to MS B data, such as length between MS A and MS B, may also prove useful in predicting
a program’s length.
A study conducted by Deitz, Eveleigh, Holzer, and Sarkani (2013) examined the
importance of developing a robust Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) prior to MS B and the effects
it may have on program success. The most important finding of their research is while only 10%
of a program’s lifecycle cost are invested prior to MS B, 70% of a program’s lifecycle costs are
committed to by MS B (Deitz et al., 2013). Similar to Jimenez et al. (2016), this suggests preMS B data is very important to predicting program outcomes. Unfortunately not many programs
have pre-MS B data since a DoD acquisition program does not officially begin until MS B. This
data limitation will be discussed later.
Based on our literature review, we gain insight into what variables may prove useful to
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predict a program’s cost and schedule as well as the likelihood cost growth and/or schedule
slippage. Additionally, we use the research to develop inclusion and exclusion criteria for our
database. Programs in our study must meet the following three criteria: 1) be unclassified, 2)
have Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) data in the Defense Acquisition Management
Information Retrieval (DAMIR) system, and 3) are designated as a Major Defense Acquisition
Program (MDAP) or pre-MDAP within DAMIR.
Conversely, there are four exclusion criteria for this research. The first requirement is
the program SAR must contain a MS A date or funding in the funding profile at least one year
prior to MS B (indicates the year in which MS A may have occurred). This requirement is due to
the pre-MS B data being found predictive in the past research we studied. Unfortunately, this
requirement also results in a great deal of programs being ineligible for inclusion because a lack
of reporting requirements prior to MS B since the program is not official until meeting MS B.
The second exclusion criteria is that the program SAR must contain a MS B date and
corresponding funding information. This again pertains to the necessity of containing pre-MS B
data as a means to build a predictive model. Without the MS B date and funding information, we
are unable to ascertain the duration of MS A or the funding spent up to MS B. Additionally, we
are unable to calculate the projected funding needed to reach IOC or the projected duration of
MS B to IOC.
The third exclusion criteria is the program SAR must contain an IOC date that occurred
prior to the last reported SAR; this indicates that the program is complete up to IOC. This is
important to our research as it gives us a termination point to estimate and ensures we are not
using projected values as actuals in our model. IOC is also important as it signifies the point in
time when the user community initially benefits from the investment in the program.
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The fourth exclusion requirement is that the program must contain a SAR within one year
of reaching MS B. This requirement allows us to ascertain what the program’s cost and schedule
estimate was at MS B and if the actual cost and schedule from MS B to IOC is within 15% or
25% of this estimate. Note, we allow one year from the time MS B occurs because the program
may not have been required to report a SAR at the time MS B occurred. Table 1 summarizes the
inclusion and exclusion criteria. Based on these criteria, we use 49 programs in our analysis—
the specific programs are listed in the Appendix.
Table 1: Program Inclusion Table
Inclusion/Exclusion
Program Included
Criteria
Jimenez et al. (2016)
56
Database
DAMIR Query
187
(MDAP/Pre-MDAP)
Doubled counted from
Jimenez et al. (2016)
Database
IOC Occurs after Last
SAR
Missing Milestones A
or B
No SAR within 1 year
of MS B
Missing IOC
Classified
Final Number

Programs Removed

Program Count
56
243

29

214

61

153

74

79

24

55

4
2

51
49
49

For each of the 49 DoD acquisition programs in our database, we use two SARs. For the
response variables, we use the last reported SAR for each program to gather the actual cost and
schedule duration for each program from MS B to IOC. For the candidate explanatory variables,
we use the SAR from the year in which MS B occurred or, if this is unavailable, the SAR within
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one year of MS B. The cost and schedule estimate from MS B to IOC in this SAR becomes the
current estimate with respect to measuring cost growth and schedule slippage. The cost growth
percentage is calculated as Current Cost Estimate at MS B − True Cost from MS B to IOC /
Current Cost Estimate at MS B. A similar calculation is computed for schedule.

Methodology

As noted earlier, the purpose of this article is to identify predictor variables that may
determine the likelihood that a DoD acquisition program will experience cost growth and/or
schedule slippage above certain thresholds. To account for the fact that programs change,
possibly due to forces outside of the program manager’s control, we employ two separate
threshold values. The first is the 15% threshold above the current estimate (both cost and
schedule) from MS B to IOC established at MS B. The second threshold is set at 25%. We
chose these overrun thresholds based upon the significant (15%) and critical (25%) definition of
Nunn-McCurdy breaches. For 30 years, the Nunn-McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. §2433) has served
as one of the principal mechanisms for notifying Congress of cost overruns in MDAPs—a
MDAP is defined as a program estimated to have research and development costs greater than
$480M or procurement costs greater than $2.79B (in FY2014 constant dollars) (Schwartz &
O’Connor, 2016).
As previously mentioned, we investigate both the total acquisition cost and duration from
MS B to IOC. All costs in our models are in Base Year 2017 (BY17) dollars using the 2016
OSD inflation indices, which prevents inflation from influencing our model. For the 15% and
25% response categories, we assign each of our 49 programs in the database to one of four
mutually exclusive categories: “Good/Good”, “Good/Bad”, “Bad/Good”, and “Bad/Bad”. A
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program is considered “good” if the final cost growth (or schedule slippage) from MS B to IOC
is less than the chosen overrun threshold; a program is considered “bad” if it equals or exceeds
the overrun threshold.
Initially, we aimed to identify variables that may predict which of the four categories a
DoD program might fall into at MS B; however, the limited sample sizes for “Good/Bad” and
“Bad/Good” prevented this. Combining these groups only resulted in nine programs with a
significant overrun and six programs with a critical overrun. Since this combined category
lacked the requisite statistical power to conduct a logistic regression analysis, we only focus on
the “Good/Good” and “Bad/Bad” categories for both the 15% and 25% thresholds. These
designations are listed in the Appendix for each program in our database.
To build our initial logistic regression model, we use a mixed stepwise approach to
identify the most predictive variables; a 0.1 level of significance was selected for the entry and
exit criteria due to the exploratory nature of our work. For the finalized model, the resultant
predictor variables from the stepwise procedure must meet the overall model Type I error of 0.1
and require each variable to be significant according to the Holm-Bonferroni criteria (Holm,
1979). We use JMP® Pro 12 for all statistical analysis performed in this article.
A logistic regression model predicts the probability of a program identifying with a
particular group by way of the following equation:

y=

e

f ( x)

e f ( x) + 1

(1)

where y is a binary variable indicating a program’s group, e is the natural exponent function, and
f (x) is considered the logit or log-odds function (Gaudard, Ramsey, & Stephens, 2006) and can
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be written in the form:

f ( x) = β 0 + β1 X 1 +  + β p X p

(2)

Equation (1) represents an s-shaped curve (White, Sipple, & Greiner, 2004) whose values range
from 0 to 1 (probability).
The X variables in (2) typify the standard explanatory variables used in linear regression,
however, the β coefficients do not represent the mean change in the response. Instead, e β i
represents the odds ratio (OR) of a particular program in our database belonging to either
“Good/Good” or “Bad/Bad” when the X variables are dichotomous (i.e., X i = 1 when a
characteristic is present or X i = 0 when a characteristic is not present). Continuous explanatory
variables do not possess this easy interpretation of ORs because there is no natural baseline
group to compare. Therefore, all explanatory variables have been converted to this dichotomous
setting.
For categorical variables, this transformation is straight-forward. For example, a dummy
variable might be coded a ‘1’ if the program is an Air Force acquisition program, ‘0’ otherwise
(i.e., is an Army, Marine, or Navy program). For continuous data, we discretize (i.e., create
categorical groupings) by utilizing histograms to determine potential break points in the data.
These break points often coincide with the quartiles (25th percentage, 50th percentage, or 75th
percentage) of the histograms.
We use two metrics to quantify the predictive capability of our logistic regression
models. The first metric is the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC).
The AUC indicates the sorting efficiency of a model with a value of 0.5 indicating merely
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random chance and a value of 1.0 indicating perfect prediction capabilities (Gaudard, Ramsey, &
Stephens, 2006). The AUC is a single measure of the overall discrimination ability of a test. In
general, “an AUC that is greater than 0.8 suggests that the diagnostics test has good
discriminatory power” (McPherson & Pincus, 2016: 80). Since we have such a small subset of
data for each group, it is infeasible to set aside a 20% validation pool. Given this limitation, we
use a technique called bootstrapping (Efron & Tibshirani, 1994) to present a 90% confidence
interval for the AUC value for each logistic regression model; these intervals provide the user
predictive limitations of the model.
The second metric to demonstrate the utility of our logistic regression models is the OR
for each explanatory variable and its corresponding confidence bound (either the lower or upper
value in the confidence interval that is closet to the value of 1). An OR equal to 1 indicates the
explanatory variable does not effect the odds of a program belonging to either the “Good/Good”
or “Bad/Bad” category. An OR > 1 implies a higher odds of a program belonging to the
“Good/Good” category, while an OR < 1 suggests a lower odds of belonging to the
“Good/Good” category (Szumilas, 2010). With respect to the confidence interval of an odds
ratio, either the lower or upper confidence bound is used to estimate the precision of the OR. In
practice, this bound is often used as a proxy for the presence of statistical significance if it does
not overlap the null value (e.g., OR = 1) (Szumilas, 2010).
Lastly, to prevent model extrapolation, the ranges of the continuous independent
variables over which the models are useful must be consistent with the bounds of the programs
used in our analysis. Using the models outside these ranges may invalidate the results. Only
three continuous explanatory variables proved statistically significant in our models. For
projected duration from MS B to IOC the range is 30 to 109 months. For projected percent

73

complete at MS B, the range is 15% to 70%. For the duration from MS A to MS B, the range is
13 to 125 months.

Results

The following subsections illustrate the logistical models derived from the stepwise
procedure along with an explanation of each significant explanatory variable. The first
subsection highlights the results regarding the “Good/Good” and “Bad/Bad” groups for the 15%
overrun threshold (Significant), while the second subsection highlights the results for the
“Good/Good” and “Bad/Bad” groupings for the 25% overrun threshold (Critical).

Significant Overrun

For this analysis, 15 programs (approximately 31% of our database) fall in the
“Good/Good” group and 25 (approximately 51% of our database) programs are in the “Bad/Bad”
group. Table 2 summarizes the logistic model and associated predictive explanatory variables
for determining the likelihood of a DoD acquisition program experiencing less than 15% cost
and schedule growth from MS B to IOC. The model has an AUC of 0.88 suggesting good model
discrimination. All of the estimated ORs and their associated confidence bounds are well above
or below 1.
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Table 2: Significant predictor variables for determining the likelihood a program will experience
cost growth and schedule slippage less than 15 percent. Numbers rounded to two significant
digits. AUC = 0.88 with a 90% bootstrapped confidence interval (1000 samples) of (0.84, 0.98).
The family-wise error rate for the independent variables is 0.10.
Variable

Estimate

Intercept
−3.32
Projected MS B 3.63
to IOC <= 58
months
Extra Large
3.37
Program
Electronic
3.27
System
Program
Projected %
3.32
Complete at
MS B <= 35%
MDAP
−3.34

Odds Ratio

Chi-Square

P-Value

N/A
37.83

Odds Ratio
Bound
N/A
5.55

3.20
7.37

0.0735
0.0066

29.13

4.58

7.01

0.0081

26.37

3.64

6.09

0.0136

27.76

3.98

5.99

0.0144

0.036

0.49

3.75

0.0529

The Electronic System Program variable indicates if the DoD acquisition program is an
electronic user interface system, avionics control system, radio network system, or similar
electronic system. The OR suggests that such systems typically display cost growth and
schedule slippage less than 15%. This appears to be in keeping with Bolten, Leonard, Arena,
Younossi, and Sollinger (2008) who also concluded that electronic systems are historically
cheaper.
For the Projected MS B to IOC Duration <= 58 Months explanatory variable, this finding
suggests that acquisition programs whose projected MS B to IOC duration is equal to or less than
58 months (or approximately 5 years) typically display cost growth and schedule slippage less
than 15%. We theorize this may be indicative of relatively shorter-scoped programs whose
technology may be relatively more mature.
The Extra Large Program explanatory variable suggests that acquisition programs with a
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high cost (greater than $17.5B BY17 dollars in total project acquisition cost) typically experience
cost growth and schedule slippage less than 15%. This is logically expected given larger
programs do not have the flexibility of having sizeable overruns given the sheer amount of
dollars involved before DoD oversight and/or Congressional reviews intervene and possibly
cancel the program. Thus, we treat Extra Large Program as more of a covariate than a traditional
explanatory variable.
The programs identified as MDAP in our database tend to suggest that this explanatory
variable will lead to cost growth and schedule slippage greater than or equal to 15%. We believe
this to be an artifact of our database due to the large number of programs that identify as MDAP
(45 of 49, or 92%) and the fact that all the programs in the “Bad/Bad” group are identified by
this variable. It is also noteworthy that three of the four programs not identified as MDAP are in
the “Good/Good” group.
Finally, the Projected % Complete at MS B <= 35% variable (calculated as the actual
time from MS A to MS B divided by the sum of the actual time from MS A to MS B and
projected time from MS B to IOC) is statistically significant; this result suggests that programs
that spend less time in the MS A-to-MS B phase relative to in comparison from MS A-to-IOC
phase experience less cost growth and schedule slippage. This may be due to a high technology
readiness level (TRL) early in the program’s life or a lesser extent of new technology involved in
the program. Such a conclusion is consistent with Dietz et al. (2013) who studied the pre-MS B
process to identify cost estimating relationships associated with identified TRLs. Their findings
indicate that programs with a higher TRL entering MS B experience smaller levels of cost
growth.
Regarding the “Bad/Bad” group, Table 3 displays the logistic model and associated
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predictor variables for determining the likelihood of a DoD acquisition program’s actual MS Bto-IOC cost and schedule exceeding its MS B estimate by 15% or more. The model has an AUC
of 0.85 suggesting good model discrimination. All of the estimated ORs and their confidence
bounds are well above or below 1.
Table 3: Significant predictor variables for determining the likelihood a program will experience
cost growth and schedule slippage equal to or exceeding 15 percent. Numbers rounded to two
significant digits. AUC = 0.85 with a 90% bootstrapped confidence interval (1000 samples) of
(0.79, 0.95). The family-wise error rate for the independent variables is 0.10.
Variable

Estimate

Intercept
1.41
Extra Large
−4.60
Program
Electronic
−3.15
System
Program
Aircraft
3.29
RDT&E at MS
1.87
B Start >=
$272M
Qty Expected at −1.95
MS B <= 305

Odds Ratio

Odds Ratio
Bound
N/A
0.09

Chi-Square

P-Value

2.65
8.89

0.1038
0.0029

0.04

0.26

6.74

0.0094

26.86
6.48

3.19
1.64

5.00
4.47

0.0254
0.0346

0.14

0.62

3.98

0.0461

N/A
0.01

Similar to the “Good/Good” model, both the explanatory variables of Extra Large
Program and Electronic System Program are statistically significant. However, both variables
have negative parameter estimates (and thus ORs much smaller than 1), which indicates
programs displaying these characteristics are much less likely to experience cost growth and
schedule slippage equaling or exceeding 15%. This is consistent with our findings from the
“Good/Good” group in Table 2.
The explanatory variable identifying a program as a fixed wing aircraft is statistically
significant in predicting whether a program is more likely to experience cost growth and
schedule slippage equaling or exceeding 15%. We believe this is due to the large and complex
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nature of these programs, especially given the modern aircraft programs, such as the F-22 and F35, in our study.
Programs in our database that expect to procure less than or equal to 305 units at MS B
tend to indicate that they are less likely to experience cost and schedule growth equaling or
exceeding 15%. We believe that this may be due to uncertainty in estimating the variable costs
for a program and the assembly line schedule. For example: if a program discovers that a
variable cost is higher than estimated, the cost is multiplied by the number of units and the more
units to be built, the higher the cost growth. The same can be said for underestimating the time a
unit will take to assemble.
The last predictor variable associated with programs experiencing cost growth and
schedule slippage equaling or exceeding 15% is for programs that spend greater than $272M in
RDT&E by the start of MS B. We believe this may be indicative of programs with a low level of
technological maturity thus requiring larger and more complex development prior to MS B. It
could also indicate that a program is integrating many highly sophisticated components and the
final design is complex in nature. As mentioned for the “Good/”Good” model, this is consistent
with Dietz et al. (2013), who researched the pre-MS B process and found that a lack of maturity
at MS B correlates with higher costs.

Critical Overrun

For this analysis, 20 programs (approximately 41% of our database) fall in the
“Good/Good” group and 23 (approximately 47% of our database) programs are in the “Bad/Bad”
group. Table 4 shows the logistic model and associated predictor variables for determining the
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likelihood that a DoD acquisition program’s true MS B-to-IOC cost and schedule will be less
than 25% larger than its MS B estimate. The model has an AUC of 0.84 suggesting good model
discrimination. All of the estimated ORs and associated 90% confidence bounds are well above
or below 1.
Table 4: Significant predictor variables for determining the likelihood a program will experience
cost growth and schedule slippage less than 25 percent. Numbers rounded to two significant
digits. AUC = 0.84 with a 90% bootstrapped confidence interval (1000 samples) of (0.78, 0.93).
The family-wise error rate for the independent variables is 0.10.
Variable
Intercept
Extra Large
Program
MDAP
MS A to MS B
>= 28 Months
1985 or Later
for MS B Start

Estimate

Odds Ratio

5.41
3.34

N/A
28.25

Odds Ratio
Bound
N/A
5.01

Chi-Square

P-Value

7.19
7.58

0.0073
0.0059

−4.54
−2.99

0.011
0.05

0.13
0.27

7.19
6.33

0.0073
0.0119

−1.69

0.19

0.69

4.08

0.0434

With respect to previous results regarding MDAP and Extra Large Programs, we see
similar results in this section. Extra Large Programs appear more likely to have cost growth and
schedule slippage less than 25%, while MDAPs are less likely to have cost growth and schedule
slippage under 25%.
For the MS A to MS B greater than or equal to 28 months explanatory variable, these
programs appear less likely to experience cost growth and schedule slippage less than 25%. A
possible explanation is that programs with relatively longer duration from MS A to MS B may
indicate a program is relying upon complex technology that must be matured, which we believe
is consistent with prior research conducted by Dietz et al. (2013).
The variable 1985 or Later for MS B Start indicates if a program is considered to be a
part of the “modern” era of defense acquisition. These programs indicate that modern programs
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appear less likely to experience cost growth and schedule slippage less than 25%. This could be
due to the increasing complexity of modern programs, which include the JSF and other highly
complex systems, and that increased complexity drives cost and schedule. This is consistent
with the work conducted by Jimenez et al. (2016), who found that these modern programs tend to
have a longer schedule.
Regarding the “Bad/Bad” group, Table 5 displays the logistic model and associated
explanatory variables for determining the likelihood of a DoD acquisition program having its
true cost and schedule from MS B to IOC exceeding its MS B estimate by 25% or more. The
model has an AUC of 0.79 suggesting fair to good model discrimination. All of the estimated
ORs and associated confidence bounds are well above or below 1.

Table 5: Significant predictor variables for determining the likelihood a program will experience
cost growth and schedule slippage equal to or exceeding 25 percent. Numbers rounded to two
significant digits. AUC = 0.79 with a 90% bootstrapped confidence interval (1000 samples) of
(0.70, 0.89). The family-wise error rate for the independent variables is 0.10.
Variable

Estimate

Odds Ratio

Chi-Square

P-Value

N/A
0.06

Odds Ratio
Bound
N/A
0.33

Intercept
Electronic
System
Program
Extra Large
Program
Aircraft

0.54
−2.74

1.47
5.72

0.2253
0.0168

−2.51

0.08

0.40

4.98

0.0257

2.10

8.19

1.52

3.20

0.0737

With respect to the explanatory variables of Extra Large Programs, Fixed Wing Aircraft,
and Electronic System Programs, we see the same trends as we did in Tables 2−4; Extra Large
Programs and Electronic System Programs are less likely to experience cost and schedule growth
greater than 25%, while Fixed Wing Aircraft are more likely to experience cost growth and
schedule slippage greater than or equal 25%. There are no additional significant variables for
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this model.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this article, we first investigate possible variables that statistically predict the
likelihood of a DoD acquisition program experiencing cost growth and schedule slippage less
than 15%. We also model the likelihood that a program would experience cost and schedule
growth in excess of (or equal to) 15%. These percentage increases are measured with respect to
the MS B-to-IOC estimates at MS B and the actual cost and schedule realized for MS B-to-IOC.
We then replicate this process to determine which variables may be predictive if the threshold
percentage increased from 15% to 25%. We chose these percentages based upon the significant
and critical thresholds as defined by the Nunn-McCurdy act.
Overall, we determined the following five variables appear to be predictive factors for
determining if a DoD acquisition program will experience less cost and schedule growth:
Electronic System Programs, programs having a Projected MS B to IOC Duration less than (or
equal to) 58 Months, Extra Large Programs, programs that expect to procure fewer than 305
units at the time of MS B, and programs with a Projected % Complete at MS B less than (or
equal to) 35%. In contrast, MDAPs, Fixed Wing Aircraft, programs where the duration between
MS A to MS B greater than (or equal to) 28 months, programs whose Projected % complete at
MS B is greater than 38% appear, modern programs that enter MS B in 1985 or later, and
programs that spend greater than, or equal to, $272M (FY17) of RDT&E funding by the
beginning of MS B to be predictive that programs are likely to experience more cost growth and
schedule slippage.
Our findings with respect to variables that incorporate the time between MS A and MS B
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are consistent with those of Dietz et al. (2013). These results suggest that programs with more
technology uncertainty or immaturity at MS B have an increased likelihood of incurring higher
cost growth and schedule slippage compared to more technologically mature programs.
Additionally our findings with respect to Electronic Systems programs are supported by Bolten
et al. (2008), though we do acknowledge that most of those programs in our database were both
small in nature (under $3B BY17) and consisted primarily of modifications.
As with any statistical model, there are limitations to our logistic regression models.
First, the database was created from SARs which may contain incomplete information. The
models built are only as good as the data used to create them. There were multiple constraints on
the data collecting process that hampered the ability to create a more robust database; foremost,
the lack of availability of pre-MS B data limited the programs that could be included.
Additionally, the search parameters in DAMIR may have unintentionally excluded programs
which could have influenced the outcome of our analysis.
In order to gain insight on a program’s potential for cost and schedule growth at such an
early stage as MS B, we attempt to leverage the knowledge of the past to see where others have
been. Our models may give program managers a glean at where they may be heading and
highlight potentials pitfalls. This set of logistic regression models are designed to provide a tool
for the DoD acquisition community to make strategic program health assessments. Practically,
these models offer the potential to help portfolio managers decide where to allocate risk dollars.
Our research differs from prior research in that our database is expanded beyond the
NASA only programs that were researched by Burgess and Krause (2014). Additionally, we
utilize program characteristics across a large range of programs in order to develop logistic
models that predict the probability of overrunning thresholds identified as being above
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acceptable levels of cost and schedule growth. No other research, to our knowledge, relates cost
or schedule growth probability to overruning such important thresholds. The models may
provide managers the ability to predict the possibility and severity of an overrun.
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Appendix: List of Programs and Their Respective Designations
Program
15%
25%
Program
15%
Group Group
Group
A-10
3
3
COBRA Judy Replacement
3
C-17
3
3
Harpoon Missile
3
F-22
3
3
NMT
2
AH-64
3
3
SH-60B
3
B-1B Computer
1
1
UGM-96A Trident I Missile 2
Upgrade
C-5 RERP
3
3
SSN 774 (Virginia Class
2
Sub)
F-15
1
1
UGM-109 Tomahawk
1
B-1B JDAM
1
1
SSBN 726 SUB
3
FA-18 A/B
2
1
AGM-114A Hellfire Missile 3
AV-8B Harrier
1
1
OH-58D Helicopter
1
P-8 Poseidon
1
1
AAWS-M Javelin
3
V-22 Osprey
3
3
B-2 EHF Inc 1
1
F-35 JSF
3
3
AH-64E Remanufacture
2
CH-47D Chinook
2
1
CH-47F
3
E-8A JSTARS
3
3
UH-60M Blackhawk
3
ALCM Missile
3
3
AESA
1
AMRAAM Missile
1
1
AGM-88E AARGM
3
JASSM Missile
3
3
CEC
3
JDAM
1
1
E-2D AHE
3
JPATS T-6A
3
3
LCS
1
GBU-39 SDB-I
1
1
MH-60S
3
National Aerospace
2
2
AEHF
3
System
AGM-88 HARM
2
2
EELV
1
AIM-9X Block 1
2
1
WGS
3
AN/BSY-1
1
1

25%
Group
2
3
2
3
1
1
1
3
3
1
2
1
2
3
3
1
3
3
3
1
3
3
1
3

Code 1 implies cost growth and schedule slippage less than 15% (or 25%)
Code 2 implies either cost growth or schedule slippage less than 15% (or 25%) but not both
Code 3 implies cost growth and schedule slippage equal to or greater than 15% (25%)
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
This chapter summarizes the findings in our research, from the cost regression model to
the four logistic regression models. We begin by summarizing these findings before we discuss
how our research questions have been answered. We then discuss the limitations of our
research and conclude by discussing further research associated with ours.
Findings
Given that our research is broken into two parts, we discuss each of them in turn. We
begin with the cost model analysis. This portion of our research focuses on predicting the
median cost of a DoD program, similar to the 73 analyzed in our database, to give the program
manager a means to impartially estimate the will-cost of a program, giving them a starting point
to cross check the program estimate and a building block to perform the should-cost estimate.
There are several findings that we consider important from this research.
The first finding we want to highlight is that MS C information, either MS C Slipping or
projected duration from MS C to IOC, was not significant for predicting cost. This is contrary
to the findings from the findings by Foreman (2007). This finding allowed us to include three
satellite programs to our database, which would have been ineligible for inclusion otherwise
due to their lack of MS C data.
Adding to this finding, the U.S. Government Accountability Office conducted a study on
space programs and presented their findings before the U.S Senate on 11 May 2011. In their
findings, they identify that space acquisition programs have historically experienced
disproportionally large cost and schedule growth (GAO, 2011). This initially lead us to believe
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that these programs are not statistically similar to other DoD programs as the research
conducted by Jimenez et al (2016). By including three space programs in our analysis and not
finding that they were statistically different, we can call that conclusion into question. It must
be noted, however, that we included only three space programs in a total database of 73
programs. Therefore, we may not have had the statistical power to detect any difference.
Of the five variables found significant in the cost model, one of the highest contributors
to our model is the amount of RDT&E funding spent at the start of MS B. Interestingly, this is
consistent with the findings by Jimenez et al. (2016) who found this variable to be predictive of
a longer schedule. This leads us to believe that front loading a program most likely indicates a
very technologically complex program which will logically have higher costs and schedule.
Shifting focus to the four logistic regression models, we are forced to remove additional
programs from our study due to data restrictions driving the program count down to 49. This,
foreseeably, lead to restrictions in terms of validating our analysis and giving us the statistical
power to detect other potential predictor variables. Unfortunately, this means that we could not
validate our models as is customary. This is unavoidable, and can be addressed by future
research by expanding the database to include more programs.
Next, we highlight the internal consistency that these models demonstrate. Electronic
System Programs, which tend to be Small Programs as well, consistently indicate that the
program will not experience an overrun. Additionally, the Extra Large Programs indicate in
every model that these programs are less likely to experience an overrun. These highlight
certain program characteristics that suggest for further research to determine an underlying
cause for why they indicate the potential for an overrun or not, as well as highlights the need for
adjusting for program size in this research. We present and discuss conjecture on why these
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variables may indicate the potential for an overrun in Chapter V, the next step for future
research is to determine why they indicate this.
Across the two portions of this research, we note many internal consistencies. The first
consistency is that electronic system programs are relevant when predicting cost and predicting
the probability of an overrun. As mentioned previously, these programs tend to be cheaper and
are less likely to experience an overrun. These may be programs that inexperienced personnel
should gain experience on without fear of large negative consequences. Another consistency
we note is that pre-MS B data is important for programs to monitor and archive. This research
and past research, as already mentioned, show that the inception of a program can have a drastic
effect on how it performs. As such, more effort should be put towards monitoring and
controlling this process.
Research Questions
The first question we set out to answer was: How can we use and build upon a previously
created database to develop a mathematical model to predict the median cost of a program? In
our research we leveraged the 56 program database built by Jimenez et al. (2016) and added 17
more programs and additional analytical variables to build a highly predictive model for the
median cost from MS B to IOC in a DoD program. By finding these additional programs and
predictive variables we are able to move the process of cost estimating forward into a data
driven process.
Answering the second question: How can we identify program characteristics for
significantly or critically overrunning either cost, schedule, or both given the current APB, at
MS B through IOC, and predict the probability that a program will experience such overruns?
In conducting this analysis, we are forced to include only 49 programs due to the requirement
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of having a program estimate within a year of MS B, which left us with a lack of power to
detect the probability of only overrunning either cost or schedule, but not the other. We are
able to give logistic regression models to program managers that identify several program
characteristics for either significantly, or critically, overrunning both cost and schedule, or
neither.
Limitations
There are several limitations to our findings that effect the applicability of this research to
the field that we are able to identify. Foremost, the lack of available program data prior to MS
B limited the inclusion of many programs. The ability of pre-MS B data to predict program
cost dictates the use of this exclusion criteria, as this data has been found to be highly
predictive, so the limitation cannot be avoided. By including 73 programs in the cost regression
model, however, we have a good-sized data pool to draw significant inference.
Shifting to the logistic regression analysis of this thesis, the requirement to remove 24
programs due to the lack of an available program estimate within a year of MS B lead to further
issues with our ability to identify predictive measures for cost and schedule overruns as outlined
previously in this thesis. This analysis is affected to such an extent that we are unable to predict
the programs that lie in the middle of our analysis and overrun either cost or schedule, but not
both. By adding more programs to this analysis there may be enough data to identify
delineating factors that bind the programs in this category. Additionally, this leaves us with too
small of a data pool to validate any of our logistic models, leaving the models un-tested when
presented with new data.
An additional limitation to our research is the fact that the analysis is only as good as the
data that goes into it. The data is gathered through the program SARs, which may contain
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faulty or incomplete data. This is an accepted limitation due to the availability of program
SARs and the lack of additional means to acquire the same program data. The missing data
from the SARs lead to the inclusion of only 73 programs in the cost model, and further reduced
the programs to 49 in the logistic regression models, thus limiting the ability for us to make
inferences in general.
Lastly, we must address the accuracy of our models and how they may be affected by the
lack of data. The cost model’s accuracy is affected greatly by the data included in generating
the model. These may very well not represent an average DoD program at all due to the
limitations already mentioned in the data. Additionally, due to the nature of the analysis, this
model gives the median program estimate. This is most useful when analyzing a portfolio of
programs from the directorate level, rather than a single program in an isolated manner. This
will allow the decision maker the greatest level of confidence and flexibility when analyzing the
results and allocating the resources. Concerning the logistic regression models, we lacked the
ability to validate the model by setting aside 20% of the data due to the small sample size. This
is an issue when discussing the potential accuracy because we simply could not test how
accurate these models may be. As mentioned in Chapter V, we use the bootstrapping method to
give a 90% confidence interval for these models to remedy this issue.
Recommendations for Future Research
There are three areas that we believe this research can be expanded upon and ultimately
improved. Firstly, as identified in prior research and already mentioned by this research, the
use of IOC as a termination date for regression analysis inherently introduces a level of known
variability that is unaccounted for in our models. By accounting for this known variability,
future researcher could increase the fidelity on actual major drivers of cost and schedule. This
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new metric for IOC would potentially look like a certain percentage of units delivered, which
could standardize all programs in the dataset. Standardizing this termination point could not
only influence how researchers analyze future DoD programs, but also potentially influence
how IOC is defined in a program.
The second area for future research we identify is expanding upon our logistic regression
models. We use MS B as a proxy for the current APB and define the two thresholds as
significant and critical from this estimate, using IOC as the termination point. It could be more
useful to include the original APB and apply the significant and critical threshold overruns from
this point in the program. This is because programs are simultaneously held accountable by the
Nunn-McCurdy Act thresholds of their current and original baselines and can breach either one
of them.
The third area for future research we identify is to expand upon the analysis of
acquisition reform to include more years in which there were major reforms. This would
expand upon the 1985 or Later for MS B Start variable identified by Brown et al. (2015) and
identify if the programs started in the different eras of acquisition reform are significantly
different from one another. This could potentially identify whether or not acquisition reform
has helped the acquisition process in terms of preventing schedule slippage or cost overruns.
As always, the limitations of a small sample size can be remedied by future research by
simply being able to add more programs to the analysis. This may give more insight into true
predictive variables for all of the models in this research. It could also identify variables we
found predictive that are not predictive to the population as a whole but, rather, an artifact of
the data we analyzed.
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Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we attempt to wrap up our entire research endeavor by discussing the
relevant findings, irrelevant findings, our limitations, and how future researchers can build upon
what we have done. Through this we are able to draw an end to what we have accomplished
and simultaneously provide a stepping off point for others to further our efforts. The findings
contained within this research have the potential to impact future cost analysts and program
managers when faced with the dilemma to estimate their portfolio’s cost and allocate resources
accordingly. To this end, we have provided the beginnings of what can become a thorough
breakdown of indicators of cost and schedule growth above and beyond what can be considered
acceptable.
We recommend the use of our logistic models as a tool to manage a portfolio of programs
in order to gain potential elusive insight into the behavioral characteristics of programs.
Additionally, we recommend the use of our cost regression model to analytically estimate the
median cost of a program, or portfolio of programs, to use as a cross-check for the will-cost
estimate and allocate resources accordingly. Additionally, by using this cost model the cost
estimator and program manager can work together to identify potential cost savings to satisfy
the should-cost mandate from the Secretary of the Air Force.
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Appendix A: Implementation of Will-Cost and Should Cost Management
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Appendix B: Predictor Variables Investigated in Thesis
•

MS A to MS B Duration (Months) – Continuous Variable
o This variable indicates the total time it took in months for a program to
complete MS A to MS B according to the last SAR date. In this variable we
are only concerned with actual schedule duration data available to the cost
estimator at the time of Milestone B/EMD start.

•

Quantity Expected at MS B – Continuous Variable
o This variable indicates the estimate of total quantity of weapons systems
that were expected to be produced at MS B at the time of the last SAR
date.

•

RDT&E $ (M) at MS B Start (BY17) – Continuous Variable
o This variable is based on raw total RDT&E dollars (in millions) that were
allocated to the program before, and up to the start of, MS B. The dollars
were all standardized into the base year, when the research began (BY17).

•

(Projected) % of RDT&E Funding at MS B Start (BY17) – Continuous Variable
o This variable is based on the percent of available RDT&E dollars
allocated to the program before, and up to the start of, MS B. While this
variable is based on a percentage, the dollars that this percentage was
derived from were all standardized into the base year, when the research
began (BY17).

•

(Projected) Total Program Acquisition Cost (BY17) – Continuous Variable
o This variable is the total projected acquisition costs, from MS B to IOC,
estimated at MS B or the earliest available program SAR. It serves to
identify how large a program is projected to be in terms of cost.

•

Modification – Binary Variable
o This variable is concerned with programs whose existence serves as a
modification to a pre-existing weapons system. If a weapons system is a
modification, it does not necessarily mean it will not have pre-MS B data
associated with it. Every program is different and, therefore, it cannot be
assumed that a modification will automatically start at MS B.

•

Prototype – Binary Variable
o This variable is concerned with programs that create a prototype, or
prototypes, of a weapons system before production of that weapons
system begins. More than one type of prototype for a weapons system
can be created in a given program.

•

Concurrency Planned – Binary Variable
o This variable addresses planned concurrency in a given program prior to
MS B. Concurrency is the proportion of RDT&E dollars that are authorized
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during the same years that Procurement appropriations are authorized. The
planned level of concurrency forces managers to make decisions that can
lead to [schedule] growth if either too much or too little concurrency is
accepted for a given program (Birchler, Christle, & Groo, 2011, p. 246).
•

1985 or Later for MS B Start – Binary Variable
o This variable accounts for a time series trend of programs that started their
MS B in 1985 or later. It is shown that programs which began development
during 1985 or later (considered “contemporary”) expend a greater
percentage of obligations by their schedule midpoint than the earlier pre1985 programs. We attribute this difference to the President’s Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense (commonly called the Packard Commission) and
the subsequent acquisition reforms.

•

Air Force – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Air Force.

•

Navy – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Navy.

•

Army – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Army.

•

Marine Corps – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the lead service on the program was the
United States Marine Corps.

•

Aircraft – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is an aircraft
program, regardless of service it is associated with. The criterion to qualify
as an aircraft for this variable is any weapons system whose primary
function is flight; both rotary-wing and fixed-wing programs.

•

Fighter Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a fighter
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Bomber Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a bomber
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.
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•

Helo Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a helicopter
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Cargo Plane Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a cargo plane
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Tanker Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a tanker plane
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Electronic Warfare Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is an electronic
warfare program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with. An electronic warfare program, as not to be confused with
an electronic system program, differs greatly in its main function(s). A
description from Lockheed Martin makes the distinction that it involves the
ability to use the electromagnetic spectrum – signals such as radio, infrared
or radar – to sense, protect, and communicate. At the same time, it can be
used to deny adversaries the ability to either disrupt or use these signals
(Electronic Warfare).

•

Trainer Plane Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a trainer plane
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Missile Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a missile program,
or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated with.

•

Electronic System Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is an electronic
system program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is
associated with. This differs greatly from the previously described
electronic warfare variable in that electronic systems programs are
principally concerned with the electronic user interface of a system,
avionics controls, or other similar applications that primarily support the
electronic usability of a system, or system of systems.

•

Submarine Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a submarine
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program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.
•

Ship Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a surface ship
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

Satellite Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the weapons system program is a satellite
program, or close variation thereof, regardless of service it is associated
with.

•

ACAT I – Binary Variable
o This variable makes the distinction if the program is an ACAT I program or
not. This is significant in that ACAT I programs deal with a much larger
dollar amount and thus are more susceptible to cost and schedule growth by
way of their large-scale and complexity efforts.

•

(Projected) MS C to IOC Duration (Months) – Continuous Variable
o This variable indicates the total estimated time, in months, for a program to
meet IOC from MS C according to the earliest available SAR estimate.
This variable has been found to be predictive of cost growth in the
programs studied by Foreman (2007). With this variable, we are concerned
with giving the cost estimator the ability to enter in the projected duration,
in months, of the gap between MS C and IOC to predict program cost.

•

(Projected) MS C Slip – Binary Variable
o This variable indicates whether the program projected date for meeting
IOC extends past the initial estimate. Foreman (2007) has found that a slip
in MS C is indicative of program cost growth in past research.

•

No MS A Date – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies whether a program did not contain a MS A date in
the schedule portion of the SAR, but did include funding at least one year
prior to MS B. This is used to identify these programs and test that they
are not statistically different from the other programs and is not used in a
predictive capacity.

•

Small Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies whether a program’s projected total acquisition
costs (RDT&E and Procurement) are below $3000 M. This value is
determined from analyzing the histogram of the (projected) total program
acquisition costs of the programs in our study and coincides closely with
the 25% value.
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•

Medium Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies whether a program’s projected total acquisition
costs (RDT&E and Procurement) are above $3000 M but below $7000 M.
This value is determined from analyzing the histogram of the (projected)
total program acquisition costs of the programs in our study and coincides
closely with the 25% to 50% range.

•

Large Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies whether a program’s projected total acquisition
costs (RDT&E and Procurement) are above $7000 M but below $17500 M.
This value is determined from analyzing the histogram of the (projected)
total program acquisition costs of the programs in our study and coincides
closely with the 50% to 75% range.

•

Extra Large Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies whether a program’s projected total acquisition
costs (RDT&E and Procurement) are above $17500 M. This value is
determined from analyzing the histogram of the (projected) total program
acquisition costs of the programs in our study and coincides with the 75%
value.

•

(Projected) % Complete at MS B Start – Continuous Variable
o This variable is inspired by the % RDT&E variable and serves to project
the percent that a program is complete, to IOC, when MS B occurs. It is
calculated by dividing the projected duration from MS B to IOC by the
sum of duration from MS A to IOC and projected duration from MS B to
IOC. This serves to indicate where the program managers believe the
program is in terms of schedule completeness. It could indicate program
maturity level.
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Appendix C: E-mail Correspondence Concerning Use of Jimenez’s Predictive Model
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